Revisiting the Married Women\u27s Property Acts: Recapturing Protection in the Face of Equality by Jones, Bernie D.
Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law
Volume 22 | Issue 1 Article 10
2013
Revisiting the Married Women's Property Acts:
Recapturing Protection in the Face of Equality
Bernie D. Jones
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ American
University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law by an authorized administrator
of Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact fbrown@wcl.american.edu.
Recommended Citation
Jones, Bernie D. "Revisiting the Married Women's Property Acts: Recapturing Protection in the Face of Equality." American University
Journal of Gender Social Policy and Law 22, no. 1 (2013): 91-147.
REVISITING THE MARRIED WOMEN'S
PROPERTY ACTS: RECAPTURING
PROTECTION IN THE FACE OF
EQUALITY
BERNIE D. JONES*
I. Introduction ..................................... ..... 92
II. The Tenancy by the Entirety and the Married Women's Property
Acts: The Early Development of a Legal Doctrine .............. 96
A. The Married Women's Property Acts: Removing Wives'
Legal Disabilities Under the Common Law...... ............ 99
B. The Married Women's Property Acts: The Property
Doctrine, Legal Theory, and Women's History ..... ..... 110
III. Coraccio v. Lowell Cents and Dime Savings Bank, King v. Greene,
and Sawada v. Endo: Failing to Ask the Debt Protection
Questions . ............................... ..... 119
A. The Married Women's Property Acts: The Modem Day
Cases in the Property Law Classroom ........ ........ 126
B. Reinterpreting the Modem Cases: What Have We Missed?......131
IV. Conclusion ............................................. 144
* Associate Professor, Suffolk University School of Law. I would like to give thanks
to: the Dean's office, especially Camille Nelson and Kathleen Engel; Michael Keefe
and Jeremy Derman, research assistants; Diane D'Angelo, research librarians; Frank
Fudy Cooper; Richard Chused and the attendees of my "thoughts out loud"
presentation at the 2011 Lutie A. Lytle conference at Thurgood Marshall Law School,
especially Audrey McFarlane and Faith Rivers James; Gwen Jordan; those attendees of
the two Suffolk University Law School faculty colloquia series who gave such helpful
comments, especially Jeffrey Lipshaw, Gabriel Teninbaum; Richard Perlmutter, Jessica
Silbey; Lisle Baker, Dwight Golann, Liz Stillman; the particpants in the 2012
Association for Law, Property and Society Conference, especially Robin P. Malloy,
Gregory Alexander, Asmara Tekle. Thanks also to Stephanie Hilton, Esq. and the staff
of the American University Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law. This article is
dedicated to Michael Jones, Eliza Jones, and Daniel Perrault.
91
1
Jones: Revisiting the Married Women's Property Acts: Recapturing Protect
Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2013
JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW [Vol. 22:1
I. INTRODUCTION
Judicial interpretations of the meaning of the Married Women's Property
Acts in the twentieth century have misinterpreted the historical meaning
and significance of the Acts in protecting married women from their
husbands' debts. Although the Acts themselves never intended to
absolutely equalize married women's status vis-A-vis their husbands,
legislators had a specific purpose. They recognized that women were
vulnerable under the common law insofar as husbands' rights to manage
and control wives' property evoked the possibility of seizure for their
husbands' debts. But with the passage of the Married Women's Property
Acts,' wives had separate property that they could use in protecting
themselves and their families. A wife need not be fearful of being put out
of doors as a result of her husband's insolvency.
But married women did not have interests only in their separate property.
Married women's interests in tenancy by the entirety marital property were
affected by the passage of these Acts. By the twentieth century, depending
on the jurisdiction and how the legislatures and courts characterized the
impact of the Acts on the common law tenancy by the entirety, married
women's rights developed according to different trajectories. In some
jurisdictions, husbands retained full control as though the common law
regime had not been changed.2 In others, married women gained equal
rights to manage property as their husbands once did, to control and subject
tenancy by the entirety marital property to their separate debts. Still again,
other jurisdictions denied husbands the rights they once had and required
them to pick up the disabilities their wives once experienced: an inability to
have the property seized for their separate debts.4
These developments impacting the tenancy by the entirety took place
primarily during the course of the nineteenth century-and in stages-as
jurisdictions passed the Married Women's Property Acts in response to
different waves of property interests. These began with the right to have
labeled as separate, the property that married women brought to their
marriages or that they received and acquired in the course of their
marriage.5 This meant that they had the right not to have their property be
considered marital property or property their husbands owned exclusively.
1. NY Married Women's Property Act, ch. 200, 1848 N.Y. Laws 307, available at
http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/awhhtml/awlaw3/property law.html [hereinafter 1848
N.Y. Laws 307].
2. Oval A. Phipps, Tenancy by the Entireties, 25 TEMPLE L.Q. 24, 29 (1951).
3. Id. at 3 1.
4. Id. at 32.
5. Id. at 27.
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Thus, they could avoid creditors accessing property that their husbands
would have controlled under the common law. Later periods extended
these rights to include protections for the labor women provided in the
home and recognition of the wages they earned in the course of their
marriages.
Modern twentieth century courts interpreted the Acts to mean equality
between spouses with respect to property rights in a harmful way and in
contravention of the intent of the nineteenth century framers. They held
that if husbands' marital interests could be seized under the common law,
wives' marital interests could be seized as well. Legislators of the earlier
period were interested in protecting wives and families from creditors and
modern courts seemed interested instead in supporting the inconceivable:
disrupting familial unity by pitting husbands against wives in their attempts
to protect creditors. Thus, by the twentieth century, when jurisdictions like
Massachusetts and New Jersey were interpreting their respective Married
Women's Property Acts, recognition of the married woman's interest in
debt protection seemed to have been lost.
In several cases where husbands' debts were at stake, courts deliberately
upheld practices that appeared to directly contravene the spirit and purpose
of the Acts.8 These were women who owned property in their own name as
wives, which the Married Women's Property Acts envisioned would be
legitimate and appropriate, yet, the women's property was seized for their
husbands' debts. These twentieth century courts forgot that as part of this
debt protection, nineteenth century legislators imagined protection of
family units and support for family unity in the face of the marketplace's
vagaries.
The courts' opinions discussed the development of the tenancy by the
entirety as a common law doctrine and how it was modernized by the
6. Reva B. Siegel, Home as Work: The First Women's Rights Claims Concerning
Wives' Household Labor, 1850-1880, 103 YALE L.J. 1073, 1113 (1994); Reva B.
Siegel, The Modernization of Marital Status Law: Adjudicating Wives' Rights to
Earnings, 1860-1930, 82 GEO. L.J. 2127, 2172-73 (1994).
7. Compare 1848 N.Y. Laws 307 (proclaiming that property owned separately by
women prior to marriage shall not be subject to the debts of a husband), with Coraccio
v. Lowell Five Cents & Dime, 612 N.E.2d 650, 655 (Mass. 1993) (holding that a
married woman's property could be subject to payment of her husband's separate
debts), and King v. Greene, 153 A.2d 49, 51 (N.J. 1959) (holding that a married
woman's property was subject to her husband's debts).
8. See Coraccio, 612 N.E.2d at 652 (holding that a married woman's property
could be subject to payment of her husband's separate debts); see also Greene, 153
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Married Women's Property Acts.9 They did not discuss in any fashion the
historical aspects of the tenancy by the entirety significant to the cases
before them, such as the debt protections in the nineteenth century that they
should have taken note of in their twentieth century deliberations. Wives
who owned separate property in these jurisdictions found that they could be
required to transfer their separate property into tenancy by the entirety
property. Upon doing so, they were threatened by seizure of their property
interest once creditors attached their husbands' share of the property
interest. Failing to take into account the debt protections meant the wives
in these cases were threatened with seizure of their property upon
foreclosure.
In New Jersey, a husband, seemingly at the behest of his creditors, sued
his wife for money she owed him.'0 He won the judgment, and as part of
the decree, she was required to put property she owed in her name only into
both their names as tenants by the entirety, which would have been in
direct contravention of the familial unity and debt protection imperatives of
the Married Women's Property Acts." Her interest in the property was
later seized in satisfaction of his judgment against her.12 The husband later
conveyed his rights, title, and interest to a third party.'3 What this meant
was that although she began with ownership in her name only, she had
nothing in the end. Not only did she relinquish half of her interest when it
became a tenancy by the entirety, but according to New Jersey law, she lost
other rights because the jurisdiction interpreted that the Married Women's
Property Act equalized spouses' rights to convey their interests in marital
property. Her interest in the property during her lifetime and her
survivorship interest could both be seized during the course of the
marriage. Since each spouse gave up all rights to the property, there was
nothing for her to get once she became a widow.
In a case from Massachusetts, a wife purchased real property in her own
name and sought a loan.14 The bank told her that she would have to put the
property in both her name and her husband's name in order to do So.1 The
bank later gave the husband loans in his name only, without her knowledge
9. See Coraccio, 612 N.E.2d at 653-54 (noting married women had an equal right
to possession and control of jointly owned property); see also Greene, 153 A.2d at 59-
60 (noting women gained right to alienate survivorship).
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or consent.16  He later defaulted.' 7  The wife only found out from a
newspaper bulletin that the property, their marital home, was under
foreclosure. 8 The court explained that the state had equalized the right of
spouses to manage and control marital property and have the property
subject to each spouse's separate debts. The bank was under no obligation
to inform the wife that her husband's interest had a lien upon it.19 The lien
could stand.2 0 She was fortunate, though, that the court found the judgment
unenforceable because as a non-debtor spouse living in the property as her
primary residence, she was protected from foreclosure.2 ' Arguably,
traditionalist assumptions about familial unity and property were at stake in
the case, insofar as it explains why the wife was required to convey the
property into her name and her husband's as tenants by the entirety. Those
presumptions about familial unity were compromised when the husband
was able to obtain loans without his wife's knowledge, thus jeopardizing
her interest in debt protection and protecting family property from
foreclosure for his debts. Nonetheless, the high court reinforced the rule of
familial unity by limiting the possibility of foreclosure.2 2
In Hawaii, the court misconstrued debt protection and familial unity
issues when it applied these to a case where it was not even relevant.23 A
tortfeasor husband was found liable for an automobile accident. Prior to
being sued, he and his wife conveyed their marital home, which they
owned as tenants by the entirety, to their sons as tenants in common.24
They continued to reside on the premises.2 5 Upon a finding of liability, the
claimants sought to overturn the conveyance as a fraudulent attempt by the
husband and wife to evade attachment of the property.26 This was
particularly important because the husband was a widower by the time the
judgment creditors sought attachment.2 7 If the court had overturned the
conveyance, he would have owned the property as a surviving spouse, with




19. Id. at 654-55.
20. Id at 655.
21. Id at 654, 656.
22. Id.
23. Sawada v. Endo, 561 P.2d 1291, 1293, 1297 (Haw. 1977).




28. Id. at 1296-97.
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on the significance of the marital interest and the policy of protecting
marital property from seizure, as though the wife were still alive and family
unity was at stake.2 9
My goal in this Article is to contribute to the literature on the Married
Women's Property Acts by explaining the significance of these modern
debt protection cases forgetting the key historical aspects of the nineteenth
century cases: protecting wives as non-debtor spouses in light of the greater
family unity concerns. This is a study that does not appear to have been
done to date. The First Section comprises the Introduction. The Second
Section explains the common law tenancy by the entirety as a property law
doctrine-one with significance for women's history and legal history. It
includes a discussion of the scholarly literature on the Married Women's
Property Acts and considers the Acts' impact upon the common law
tenancy by the entirety. The Third Section develops an in-depth study of
the twentieth century cases that interpreted the Married Women's Property
Acts in New Jersey, Massachusetts, and Hawaii. The third section includes
a discussion of some of the textbook literature where these cases are
discussed. Not only does the scholarly literature fail to address the
significant debt protection, gender questions, and family unity matters, but
the textbook literature, where students first see coverage of these issues,
reflects these shortcomings as well. I emphasize the significance of
developing an improved understanding of the debt protections that have
been at the heart of the Married Women's Property Acts.
The Conclusion appears in Section Four. This improved understanding
has implications for teaching property law doctrine, advocacy, and legal
theory. The debt protections and family unity concerns in the Married
Women's Property Acts had a unique context in gender and women's
historical status as dependents upon their husbands. Advocates failed to
protect their clients' rights while adjudicators lost the true context of the
Acts through these modern day interpretations.
II. The Tenancy by the Entirety and the Married Women's Property Acts:
The Early Development of a Legal Doctrine
The fee simple absolute is the basic form of ownership of property in
American law; ownership confers rights described as a "bundle of sticks"
comprising an "exclusive right of possessing, enjoying, and disposing of a
thing." 0o What this means is that once someone becomes the owner of
property, she has certain rights that will be enforced by law, including a
29. Id. at 1297.
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right to possess it and exclude others from possessing it. Having a right to
enjoyment means the right to be left alone in using the property without
any other rival claimants asserting rights and without others' nuisance
activity compromising one's ability to use the property. The right to
dispose of the property includes the right to convey the property to others
within the course of one's lifetime or by devise upon one's death.
Concurrent interests complicate matters further in that fee simple
absolute rights are not held singly; rather they are held by at least one other
person. Concurrent interests mean that rights have to be negotiated among
the owners, as they all hold the property in fee simple absolute. They have
a property relationship among themselves and to the property at stake.
American property law doctrine recognizes three forms of concurrent
interests: the joint tenancy, the tenancy in common, and the tenancy by the
entirety.31 Each has specific rules determining how the owners share the
property, divide expenses, and reap the profits. Other rules determine what
happens if a party wishes to leave the tenancy, the parties want to end the
tenancy all together, or a party dies during the course of the tenancy.32
Beginning with the joint tenancy, there are four unities that explain and
determine the distinct rights and obligations of the owners. First, the
owners must take the property at the same time; second, they receive their
interests through the same document of title. Third, they have equal
interests in the property, sharing the expenses and profits equally; within
the fourth unity, there is a corresponding equal right to possess the whole.
The right of survivorship states that when one owner dies, the others have
the right to take the whole property. The joint tenancy can be partitioned,
meaning the tenancy can be ended all together. This can be done in one of
two ways: in kind, with each tenant getting a portion of the property, or by
sale, with each tenant getting a share of the proceeds. The joint tenancy
can also be severed, meaning one party can be removed from the tenancy
and be replaced by another. This turns the joint tenancy into a tenancy in
common.
With respect to the tenancy in common, the rights and obligations of
these concurrent owners are different from those shared by joint tenants.
The tenancy in common requires only one unity, that of possession. Each
tenant has a right to occupy the whole. They can receive their interests at
different times and through different documents of title. They need not
have equal interests in the property. There are no survival rights; each
31. CORNELIUS J. MOYNIHAN, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 207
(2d ed. 1988).
32. Id. at 210, 213, 219, 222.
33. Id. at 207-08.
34. Id. at 212-14.
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tenant's share can be inherited by will (devise) or through intestacy
(descent). A tenant can convey a share of the tenancy and sever the
tenancy in common as a result. Upon severance, the tenancy remains a
tenancy in common, as a party to the tenancy is merely replaced by
another. Partition acts the same as in a joint tenancy. The tenancy is
ended, and the tenants take a share of the property or take a share of the
proceeds from the sale.
The tenancy by the entirety, as one of the forms of concurrent interests in
property law, is a tenancy held exclusively by spouses. 35 There are five
unities where the joint tenancy had only four. The spouses must take the
property at the same time, through the same document of title, with equal
interests in the property and equal rights to possess the whole. The fifth
unity is of marriage, which requires that the spouses must be married at the
time the conveyance is made to them. Drawing upon traditionalist notions
of marriage, the common law tenancy created a fictional unity that the
married couple shared one legal identity. Here, the married couple held an
indestructible right of survivorship, which meant the tenancy could not be
severed or partitioned.36 Crucially, however, legal ownership was held in
the husband.
As Phipps noted in an early study of the tenancy by the entirety:
The husband had certain exclusive property rights: the privilege and
power to occupy the property and to consume the income of the asset; to
manage, control, and dispose of possession and of income during the
marriage; to use the property as collateral, his possessory and contingent
survivor interests being subject to attachment for his debts but not for
those of the wife; to sue and be sued in litigation. His right to immediate
possession and his contingent right to occupy the whole could be
alienated by him and attached by creditors during the marriage.
However, the interest taken could be defeated should the wife survive
him.37
According to Phipps, the common law rule held that "a transfer of title to
the husband and wife was a transfer to an entirety and unity under the
husband's dominion, since both the spouses were regarded together as
one."38
35. Note that in those jurisdictions-Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana,
Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, and Washington, which had a strong civil law presence,
the "tenancy by the entireties never ha[d] been recognized because it [was] inconsistent
with the fundamental community property system." Phipps, supra note 2, at 32.
36. MOYNIHAN, supra note 31, at 219, 221.
37. Phipps, supra note 2, at 25-26.
38. Id. at 24.
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A. The Married Women's Property Acts: Removing Wives' Legal
Disabilities Under the Common Law
Once state legislatures began passing Married Women's Property Acts,
the laws removed the disabilities that wives experienced under the Anglo-
American common law when they were denied rights to the separate
property they brought into their marriages or that they acquired in the
course of the marriage. 3 9  This meant that family property could be
protected from a husband's creditors and that family unity would be
upheld. Under the common law, single women could own and manage
their property as they saw fit.4 0 That changed once they married; marital
interests applied to property owned by spouses. The tenancy by the
entirety defined this marital interest, with the doctrine of coverture, which
set forth the husband as the source of the family's legal identity. Thus, the
wife had no right to manage her property. She also had no right to manage
any of the familial property. These rights were all under her husband's
purview.4 1
The Married Women's Property Acts stated that any property a single
woman brought into her marriage remained her separate property; it was
not under her husband's control and not liable to seizure for paying his
debts.4 2  Any property a married woman acquired in the course of her
marriage remained her separate property as well.4 3 In addition, a wife
could receive property by gift or bequest for her "sole and separate use," as
though she were a single woman.4 Once again, her property would not be
"subject to the disposal of her husband nor be liable for his debts."45 What
this meant for family unity and the protection of families from a husband's
creditors was that there was a limited source of property that could be
attached in the wake of a husband's bankruptcy.
With respect to the rise of the Married Women's Property Acts and the
39. See generally Amy D. Ronner, Husband and Wife Are One-Him: Bennis v.
Michigan as the Resurrection of Coverture, 4 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 129, 132 (1996)
(noting that common law jurisdictions recognize that spouses might each hold separate
property, property held in his or her name only). Community property jurisdictions in
turn-Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, and
Washington don't recognize separate property. As marriage is a partnership, all assets
held by each of the spouses is seen as belonging to the marriage as a whole. Phipps,
supra note 2, at 32, 37-38.
40. Ronner, supra note 39, at 132.
41. MOYNIHAN, supra note 31, at 219.
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tenancy by the entirety, jurisdictions determined "whether the husband's
powers and the wife's disabilities, now abrogated, had been incidents of the
co-tenancy status or merely attributes of the marital status.'" 6 The answer
determined what would happen to the tenancy by the entirety in the wake
of the Acts' passage. It also determined the extent to which courts in the
jurisdictions would engage in the debate over protection versus equality.
Phipps explained that three possibilities emerged. Those states that saw the
tenancy as being predicated upon "common law property relations of
spouses and the husband's dominance," could not reconcile women's
emancipation with the persistence of the tenancy and would abolish it all
together.4 7 Orth notes further, "courts took the entirely logical position that
once the rights of married women to hold property were recognized; the
two were no longer one and there was no longer any such estate as [the]
tenancy by the entirety."4 8
While some jurisdictions that upheld the tenancy by the entirety did not
emphasize the possibilities to be found in wives' equality, others took a
different view.49 These were jurisdictions that recognized the possibilities
of equality to be found in the acts when they considered abolition of the
tenancy by the entirety.50 Equality under the law could remain a shield for
inequality in fact and in practice, which a number of states realized when
46. Phipps, supra note 2, at 28; see also 1848 N.Y. Laws 307.
Sec. 1. The real and personal property of any female who may hereafter marry,
and which she shall own at the time of marriage, and the rents issues and
profits thereof shall not be subject to the disposal of her husband, nor be liable
for his debts, and shall continue her sole and separate property, as if she were a
single female. Sec. 2. The real and personal property, and the rents issues and
profits thereof of any female now married shall not be subject to the disposal
of her husband; but shall be her sole and separate property as if she were a
single female except so far as the same may be liable for the debts of her
husband heretofore contracted. Sec. 3. It shall be lawful for any married
female to receive, by gift, grant devise or bequest, from any person other than
her husband and hold to her sole and separate use, as if she were a single
female, real and personal property, and the rents, issues and profits thereof, and
the same shall not be subject to the disposal of her husband, nor be liable for
his debts. Sec. 4. All contracts made between persons in contemplation of
marriage shall remain in full force after such marriage takes place.
47. Phipps, supra note 2, at 28-29 ("This view ... as abrogating entireties estates
all together-has been expressly followed in at least nine states." These states are:
Alabama, Colorado, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Minnesota, New Hampshire, South
Carolina, and Wisconsin).
48. John V. Orth, Tenancy by the Entirety: The Strange Career of the Common-





Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 22, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 10
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol22/iss1/10
2013] REVISITING THE MARRIED WOMEN'S PROPERTY ACT
they engaged in gender-based critiques. They remembered that the tenancy
by the entirety had a foundation in domination that could not coexist with
the rhetoric of equality found in the property acts. Courts then interpreted
the acts as having abolished the tenancy by the entirety all together.5'
Therefore the tenancy by the entirety was "inconsistent with judicial
interpretations of the common law of those states: Connecticut, Nebraska,
and Ohio." 52
These jurisdictions that rejected the tenancy by the entirety on the basis
of gender offer early perspectives on what was a developing jurisprudence
of gender and property matters. Even though these states' doctrinal
developments have been discussed, gender was not part of the
conversation. The overriding concern in those early cases, just as in those
states that retained the tenancy by the entirety, was that wives could
become vulnerable to husbands' creditors and that families would be
unprotected if a husband went bankrupt and there was no means of
protecting them from foreclosure.
In some jurisdictions, the end of the tenancy was noted merely as being a
matter-of-fact implication of married women now having a legal identity
51. See id.
52. Phipps, supra note 2, at 32; see, e.g., Whittlesey v. Fuller, 11 Conn. 337, 341
(1836) (noting that the tenancy by the entirety does not exist because the wife has a
separate existence and her identity is not destroyed by marriage; instead, husband and
wife take land as tenants in common, because the state does not recognize a right of
survivorship); Kerner v. McDonald, 84 N.W. 92, 92 (Neb. 1900). The extent to which
the common law was intended to apply to the institutions of the state meant that
tenancy by the entirety does not exist. See also Sergeant v. Steinberger, 2 Ohio 305,
305-07 (1826). A father granted to his daughter and her husband, and their heirs and
assigns, 300 acres of land forever. The daughter died before the husband, leaving five
children, one of whom was the plaintiff. Upon the woman's death, her husband
devised the lands to three of the other children, excluding the plaintiff. The court held
that no type of joint tenancy exists in Ohio, and that any such estate is treated as a
tenancy in common, noting the absence of any statute recognizing a right of
survivorship. Thus, an undivided half interest in the property descended to all of the
children who became tenants in common with their father. See also Shafer v. Shafer,
30 Ohio App. 298, 298-300 (Ohio Ct. App. 1928). The defendant-wife and plaintiff-
husband were married but living separately and apart, though both were joint owners of
certain real estate. The wife filed for partition, which the husband resisted. The court
held that a wife is completely emancipated in so far as her separate property rights are
concerned, and cited three provisions of the General Code of Ohio to support its
holding. § 8001 ("A married person may take, hold and dispose of property, real or
personal, the same as if unmarried."); § 7999 ("A husband or wife may enter into any
engagement or transaction with the other, or with any other person, which either might
if unmarried."); § 7998 ("Neither husband nor wife has any interest in the property of
the other.").
53. See, e.g., Phipps, supra note 2, at 32-33.
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separate and apart from their husbands.54 Hence, the tenancy could no
longer persist, especially because the Married Women's Acts offered
married women protective measures. In Wisconsin, the statute of 1850 was
"[an] act to provide for the protection of married women in the enjoyment
of their own property."55 Married women could "receive by inheritance, or
by gift, grant, devise or bequest, from any person other than her husband,
and hold to her sole and separate use.. .. 56 Thus, a woman's property
would be no longer "liable for the debts of the husband."5 7 In addition, her
property was protected from "being sold or controlled by him."58
An interesting theme was the early recognition that the tenancy by the
entirety had merely been a legal fiction. The legal fiction occurred because
the husband and wife were truly one person under the law; the wife's legal
identity disappeared during the course of her marriage. As such, she could
not hold property in her own name and any conveyance to her alone would
be void.59 As an Iowa court noted, the tenancy by the entirety "always
stood upon what was little more than the merest fiction, and, as this, by our
legislation, has measurably given way to theories and doctrines more in
accord with the true and actual relation of husband and wife, the tenancy
itself must be abandoned."60  As a Colorado court noted, the Married
Women's Property Act was a radical move:
This statute abrogates the rule of the common law and gives to the wife a
separate and distinct independent existence from that of her husband in
their relative property rights. The fiction of one legal personality no
longer exists. They now stand upon an equality in the acquisition,
ownership, and conveyance of property, and she can now accuire and
convey real estate as though the marriage relation did not exist.
This development, an Illinois court noted, was a progressive one unique
to those states that saw themselves as holding differently from other
jurisdictions where married women still could not "hold separate
,,62
property.
54. Donegan v. Donegan, 15 So. 823, 824 (Ala. 1894); Walthall v. Goree, 36 Ala.
728, 735 (1860).




59. Fay v. Smiley, 207 N.W. 369, 370-71 (Iowa 1926).
60. Hoffman v. Stigers, 28 Iowa 302, 309 (1869); see Fay, 207 N.W. at 371 (noting
that even though deeds to husband and wife in the eyes of the common-law rule would
create an estate in entirety, the state has never recognized the practice).
61. Whyman v. Johnston, 163 P. 76, 77 (Colo. 1917).
62. Cooper v. Cooper, 76 111. 57, 65 (1875).
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Gwen Jordan credits Myra Bradwell with spearheading the Illinois law
reform movement to pass the Married Women's Property Act in that
state.63 In 1861, Illinois passed its first act--one that was interpreted by
the court not to mean equality for women but instead protection of their
property rights in the face of their husbands' "economic misfortunes,
imprudence or possible vice."" Through the Married Women's Property
Act, vulnerable women could protect their property "from being levied on
and sold" or "squandered."65  As an example, the act did not protect a
wife's earnings or any property she bought with those earnings-these
earnings still belonged to her husband.66 Bradwell's efforts led to the
passage of a new act in 1869, one that granted women those protections.
Massachusetts was a state whose legislation was not as broad and was
less "liberal on the subject,"6 8 since "rights in Massachusetts' tenancies by
the entirety were predominantly shaped by the common law."69 In 1886,
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court interpreted the Married
Women's Property Act to apply only to the property a woman had as her
separate property, and inapplicable to tenancies by the entirety. 70 For that
reason, the tenancy persisted in its common law form: husbands alone had
the right to manage tenancy by the entirety property. Only the husband's
interest in the property could be attached. As a result of the Married
Women's Property Act, in neighboring Maine, women were "invested with
greater privileges and weighted with greater responsibilities and liabilities
than before."7 More striking though, the Maine court found that the
common law tenancy by the entirety had an irrational and troubling basis:
"[i]t had its origin in feudal institutions and social conditions which were
superseded centuries ago by the more enlightened principles of a
progressive civilization."72
63. See Gwen Hoerr Jordan, Agents of (Incremental) Change: From Myra
Bradwell to Hillary Clinton, 9 NEV. L. J., 580, 595 (2009) (reporting that Bradwell
published stories and editorials that described the dire consequences of women's legal
inequality to mobilize support for women's rights leading up to the passage of the
Married Women's Property Act).
64. Id. at 596.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 597.
68. Cooper v. Cooper, 76 Ill. 57, 65 (1875).
69. Janet D. Ritsko, Comment, Lien Times in Massachusetts: Tenancy by the
Entirety After Coraccio v. Lowell Five Cents Savings Bank, 30 NEW. ENG. L. REV. 85,
99 (1996).
70. Id. at 97-98.
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Modem Americans attuned to a unique "idea of the enjoyment and
devolution of property" within "the true theory of the marriage relation"73
had no time for such an outdated property concept and doctrine. As such,
Minnesota retained none "of the incidents of it" and refused any longer to
recognize the tenancy by the entirety. 74 In Nebraska, the marital tenancy
was seen as being on par with another old-fashioned practice under the
common law "whereby the husband was, under certain circumstances,
permitted to inflict corporal punishment on his wife."7 Just as "all right-
thinking men" rejected women's subordination through domestic violence,
they rejected any doctrines that supported subordination with respect to
property rights:
Hence there seems to be no better reason for holding that a conveyance
of an estate to two persons, they being husband and wife, by one
instrument, creates an estate in entirety, than to hold that the conveyance
of an estate to two persons not husband and wife will create a like estate,
and not an estate in joint tenancy.76
Wisconsin is an example of a jurisdiction that also looked to the joint
tenancy as the default marital tenancy once the Married Women's Property
Act was passed by its legislature.7 7 This is not surprising because the joint
tenancy offers a number of similar protections to tenants as a tenancy by
the entirety, namely survivorship rights. It is also gender-neutral, meaning
it is without the disabilities imposed upon married women under the
common law marital tenancy. As was mentioned earlier, joint tenants take
their interests at the same time, through a document of title that grants each
tenant equal rights to possess the whole, with survivorship interests in case
one tenant predeceases the other. Another possibility for those
jurisdictions was a tenancy in common. This concurrent property interest
has no survivorship interest; the owners need not take their interest at the
same time and need not have equal interests in the property. Thus, this
tenancy was the least likely to accord the survivorship protections spouses
might prefer.79 Each tenant in common has a separate share, which can be
passed on to devisees or heirs at law. For that reason, spouses in
jurisdictions that do not recognize the tenancy by the entirety might prefer
73. Id.
74. Wilson v. Wilson, 45 N.W. 710, 711 (Minn. 1890).
75. Kerner v. McDonald, 84 N.W. 92, 92 (Neb. 1900).
76. Id.
77. Haas v. Williams, 261 N.W. 216, 217 (Wis. 1935); Helvie v. Hoover, 69 P.
958, 961 (Okl. 1902).
78. MOYNIHAN, supra note 31, at 207-08.
79. See, e.g., Lower v. Lower, 203 N.W. 312, 314 (S.D. 1925); see also Wolfe v.
Wolfe, 42 So. 2d 438 (Miss. 1949).
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the joint tenancy to the tenancy in common to ensure the possibility of
survivorship rights.
In Kansas, the right to maintain separate property rights was linked
specifically to women's political rights, an argument developed by
suffragists of the period who drew upon notions of political independence
and property ownership dating back to the thinkers of the Early Republic.8 0
Thus, a Justice on the state Supreme Court noted, "woman is in nearly all
matters according civil and political equality with man. She is not his
servant, nor his slave."8 ' Notwithstanding suffragists' ideals about
equality, that view did not motivate all legislatures and courts. In Montana,
equal rights to property did not minimize women's obligations to their
husbands to serve.82
It is striking that in a fair number of these states, the language of equality
seemed to be irrelevant. Women's newfound ability to manage their own
property was merely a matter-of-fact occurrence. The property law
changed, and as such, either the old doctrinal order no longer existed or the
matter of equality was merely a matter-of-fact occurrence. Equality was at
the forefront of some courts' deliberations and assessments of the Married
Women's Property Acts. This did not translate to equality in all respects,
according to the legislatures and the courts. Women still had obligations to
fulfill traditional roles in the home, and this equality was merely with
respect to protecting their property rights. In the eyes of some reformers
who supported these acts, this conceptualization of equality was linked of
course, to the nineteenth century vision of feminism according to the first
wave of the women's rights movement with its eventual ties to suffrage.83
Women's needs and interests were not represented through men's political
participation in the polity, but they deserved to be. Since property was
directly tied to that participation, insofar as women could be taxed but they
could not vote, suffragists like Bradwell believed in the abolition of
common law doctrines and presumptions that limited women's
possibilities.84
80. Phipps, supra note 2, at 33.
81. Baker v. Stewart, 19 P. 904, 913 (Kan. 1888).
82. Emery v. Emery, 200 P.2d 251, 264 (Mont. 1948) ("Even under statutes such as
ours, enlarging the rights of married women, it is the duty of the wife, without
compensation, to attend to all the ordinary household duties and labor faithfully in the
advancement of her husband's interests.").
83. E.g., SANDRA F. VANBURKLEO, "BELONGING TO THE WORLD" WOMEN'S
RIGHTS AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURE 181-84 (2001); GRETCHEN RITTER,
THE CONSTITUTION AS SOCIAL DESIGN: GENDER AND CIVIC MEMBERSHIP IN THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 35-39 (2006).
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The married women's acts and the women's movement interacted in a
cause-and-effect relationship. Initiated to meet legal and commercial
needs, the earliest acts stimulated public awareness of married women's
common law disabilities and encouraged the development of the
women's movement [which] pressed legislatures to respond at least
minimally to their increasingly radical demands, including the demand
for suffrage.85
To abolish the common law tenancy by the entirety, certain legal fictions
had to be abolished as well. Lon L. Fuller, the legal realist, once explained
legal fictions as a rhetorical tool used by judges and writers "on legal
topics" who make statements that they know to be false and fictional."
The intent is not to deceive, but they are used as linguistic phenomena
when jurists and legal thinkers aim to maintain internal coherence within
legal doctrine even though "the rule of law has undergone alteration."87
Perhaps the law as it exists or the changes to it that have occurred do not
reflect current social and cultural understandings of legal relations.88 Thus,
Fuller explains, statements about law can be grounded in perceptions of
legal relations or in terms of legal facts.
Fuller found the perfect example in perceptions about marital relations at
the heart of the common law tenancy by the entirety: that "husband and
wife are one," which was a fiction that explained a perception about legal
relations not grounded in factual reality.90 That perception influenced the
development of legal rights under the common law tenancy by the entirety.
These only came to be rejected as more states passed the Married Women's
Property Acts and reinterpreted the marital relation in a different fashion.
Fuller notes that "fiction[s] die when a compensatory change takes place in
the meaning of the words or phrases involved, which operates to bridge the
gap that previously existed between the fiction and the reality."9' When a
fiction does not die, an overarching premise assumed within the fiction
persists, and it is useful in reconciling the decision at hand with the
possibilities posed by legal change.92
85. NORMA BASCH, IN THE EYES OF THE LAW: WOMEN, MARRIAGE AND PROPERTY
IN 19th CENTURY 148, 166 (1982).
86. LON L. FULLER, LEGAL FICTIONS 1 (1967).
87. Id. at 6.
88. Id. at 27 ("The desire to keep the form of the law persuasive is frequently the
impulse to preserve a form of statement that will make the law acceptable ....
8 9. Id.
90. Id at 33.
91. Id. at 14. Compare rejection of fictions to redefinitions where, "a change in a
word meaning that eliminates the element of pretense." The fiction is killed off, but in
a different way from rejection in which the fiction is simply discarded. Id. at 20.
92. Id at 53 ("It is intended to escape the consequences of an existing, specific rule
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The existence of the legal fiction of marital unity justified the tenancy by
the entirety. In those jurisdictions that refused to recognize the possibility
of the Married Women's Property Acts changing married women's
property interests, a different goal was at stake-rejection of the Married
Women's Property Acts and the equality arguments of its supporters.
Notwithstanding wives' interest in protecting themselves and their families
from husbands' debts in the name of family unity, the legal fictions were to
be maintained. Thus, one can explain the contortions the Massachusetts
court went through in the late nineteenth century when it saw the Married
Women's Property Acts as applying only to women's separate property,
and not to property held jointly by the spouses, as though a wife could not
possibly have any stake in her husband's management of marital property.
In the midst of all these discussions of marriage and their effects upon
women's property rights, critics of the legal fiction of marital unity did not
get so far as to view the marriage institution in general as a fiction.93 Fuller
explained, "the reality of a legal institution, understood in this sense, is in
no wise affected by the fact that it may be convenient to describe the
institution linguistically in fictitious terms."94 As Richard Chused argued,
mere recognition of married women's property rights did not mean
wholesale rejection of traditionalist norms about women and marriage. For
example, husbands were to persist as the head of the household, and
women were to remain dedicated to their household responsibilities and
duties.95  In those jurisdictions that saw themselves as progressive in
rejecting the tenancy by the entirety, a new egalitarian ethos was to define
women's ability to control property while married.
It is important to note that traditionalist views about husbands as heads
of households presumed a concomitant obligation of husbands to protect
and provide for their more vulnerable wives; this is what made the Married
Women's Property Acts palatable. What is striking about jurisdictions like
Massachusetts and New Jersey, which recognized equality in spouses'
property rights in the twentieth century, is that in these states courts seemed
to reject traditionalist ideals about protection while they saw as perfectly
normal the traditionalist behavior of the husbands in acting as heads of
households with rights to manage property-theirs and their wives'. The
wives had separate property in their names only, to which the husbands had
access. Additionally, the wives were not protected from their husbands'
debts.
of law.").
93. Id. at 37-38.
94. Id at 38.
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With respect to those states that retained the tenancy by the entirety,
Phipps noted distinctions among them that determined spousal rights.96 He
identified four groups.97 Massachusetts fit into Group One, along with
Michigan and North Carolina.9 8  These states found that nothing had
changed with the passage of the Married Women's Property Acts. A
husband's creditors could foreclose on the debtor husband's interests and
take possession of the whole in case he survived his wife.99 In addition,
"the husband, and only he, [was] vested with exclusive rights to the
possession, management and control . . . ."1oo Finally, a creditor could
seize the assets during the course of the marriage upon notice to the
husband; a wife's survivorship interest could be seized only upon notice to
her.10 Wives in these jurisdictions were vulnerable if their husbands
mismanaged marital property; they need not ever find out what was going
on as creditors could seize marital property. Wives only had the right to
receive the entire property upon the death of their husbands.
Group Two states explained that the effect of the Married Women's
Property Acts made the tenancy by the entirety operate like the joint
96. Phipps, supra note 2, at 33-34.
97. Id. at 33-35.
98. Id. at 33-34.
99. Id. at 30; see Diane Avery & Alfred S. Konefsky, The Daughters of Job:
Property Rights and Women's Lives in Mid-Nineteenth-Century Massachusetts, 10
LAW & HisT. REv. 323, 326 (1992) (discussing the property rights of Massachusetts
women prior to the Married Women's Property Acts). "A single woman who owned
property could face substantial economic risks when she entered into a marriage. Her
husband became the owner, outright, of all her personal property. Nominally the wife
retained ownership of her real property because it could only be sold by joint deed and,
if she survived her husband, was 'at her disposal, as it was before the marriage.'
During marriage, the husband was entitled to control and manage all her real property
and to receive its rents and profits. Thus, the husband owned all the economic value of
any property that a woman might bring to or acquire during marriage-stocks and
bonds, bank accounts, houses, farms, carriages, cattle, and even wages .. . a husband's
creditors could reach all the husband's interest in this property, even to satisfy his
premarital debts." See also Acts and Resolves of Massachusetts, ch. 209, 1846 Mass.
Acts. § 1 (discussing a noteworthy statute enabling married women to receive the
wages they earned). "In all cases where married women shall hereafter, by their own
labor, earn wages, payment shall be made to them for the same." Her husband's
creditors still had the right to attach wages she might have had deposited into "any
individual or savings bank, or institution for savings."
100. Id. at 40.
101. See id. ("Notice to the husband [was] all that would be required to effect
jurisdiction over the interests of possession, income and profits during the marriage,
but the wife's survivorship interest could not be divested except upon notice to her and
upon her participation in any litigation respecting the entire assets."). This applied in
Arkansas, New York, New Jersey, and Oregon.
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tenancy or the tenancy in common with respect to creditors' rights, without
a corresponding right to defeat the right of survivorship.102  A debtor
spouse's interest could be attached. Group Three states, eleven
jurisdictions in turn, continued to recognize the tenancy by the entirety and
created certain protections (i.e., for spouses with homestead rights where
each occupied the property without rights to alienate the spousal share).103
Creditors could not attach for separate debts.' 04  Group Four states
comprised only two jurisdictions that permitted each spouse in a tenancy by
the entirety to alienate only the contingent right of survivorship during the
marriage; use and profits were protected from seizure during the
marriage. 05
Thus, equalizing married women's property status to that of their
husbands' did not mean that the tenancy by the entirety would be rejected
all together in all jurisdictions. A number of states did abolish it, as was
discussed earlier and as Phipps's typology explained. Others merely kept
the estate but modified the meaning to reflect greater equality in each
spouse's rights. In Group Two jurisdictions, like Arkansas, New Jersey,
New York, and Oregon, "the wife's prerogatives" were increased until they
matched those of the husband, "making the wife relatively a free agent as
to her undivided one-half interest."10 6  The estate became a "tenancy in
common during the marriage, but with the right of survivorship
indefeasible by separate action of either co-owner except upon divorce." 07
Group Three jurisdictions included Delaware, District of Columbia,
Florida, Indiana, Maryland, Missouri, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
Vermont, Virginia, and Wyoming. In Group Four jurisdictions, which
included Kentucky and Tennessee, "equality between the spouses" was
"effected by decreasing the husband's prerogatives until his state of
disability as to any separate action without connivance of the opposite
102. Id at 34.
103. Id
104. See id. (noting that the states implicated were Delaware, District of Columbia,
Florida, Indiana, Maryland, Missouri, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, and
Virginia).
105. Id. These states were Kentucky and Tennessee. Note that Phipps' article was
written too early for discussion of Hawaii and Alaska as these states were territories at
the time. Each eventually recognized married men and women as having equal rights
to manage marital property. Alaska explained that inequality between spouses
amounted to "unjust usurpation of property or natural rights," ALASKA STAT. §
25.15.110 (1974), while Hawaii interpreted its tenancy by the entirety several years
later. See Sawada v. Endo, 561 P.2d 1291 (1977).
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spouse [was] as complete as that of the wife." 08
B. The Married Women's Property Acts: The Property Doctrine, Legal
Theory, and Women's History
Phipps' work serves as an important foundation for understanding the
tenancy by the entirety as a legal doctrine and for explicating the
developments that followed once legislatures began passing the Married
Women's Property Acts. To gain a greater understanding of the debt
protections and family unity concerns that pushed women's rights activists
to support passage of the Married Women's Property Acts, however, it is
important to turn to feminist legal theory and the state of women's history
scholarship on wives' legal status in the nineteenth century. Feminist legal
theory operates under the presumption that women have traditionally faced
serious obstacles to reaching equality in society and that these obstacles
have had a basis in law.'09 Modem feminist legal theory has its roots in
various intellectual currents in American history: the movement to protect
married women's property rights in the early to mid-nineteenth century, the
suffrage movement of the late-nineteenth century to the early-twentieth
century, and the women's rights movement of the 1970s.110 The legal
foundations for this latest women's rights movement lay in legal realism, a
school of thought that developed in the early-twentieth century in response
to the older formalism of classical legal thought that pervaded American
legal culture through the late-nineteenth century.
This legal realism aimed to highlight the shortcomings of Langdellian
legal science in failing to recognize the value-laden realities of law."'
Legal scholars adhering to this framework observed that the law is a social
institution-not an entity which can be separated from the cultural. It is
not autonomous as it develops its purposes, draws inspiration, cues, and
rationalizations for action and policy from the society surrounding it.112
Frances Olsen notes the different perspectives feminist legal theorists
108. Id. at 32.
109. E.g., NANCY LEVIT & ROBERT R. M. VERCHICK, FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY: A
PRIMER xiii (2006).
110. Id.
111. ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE
1850S TO THE 1980s 156 (1983) ("Kill the Langdellian notion of law as an exact
science, based on the objectivity of black-letter rules. When it became acceptable to
write about the law as it actually operated, legal rules could no longer be assumed to be
value free.").
112. E.g., Heather Ruth Wishik, To Question Everything: The Inquiries of Feminist
Jurisprudence, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN's L.J. 64, 64-77 (1985).
110
20
Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 22, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 10
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol22/iss1/10
2013] REVISITING THE MARRIED WOMEN'S PROPERTY ACT
brought to their assessments of law.1 13 Legal reformers believed that law
was rational, objective, and principled, but highlighted how law failed to
live up to this aspiration with respect to women: 114
[R]eformist feminists condemn laws that deny women rights-or
otherwise harm women-as irrational, subjective and unprincipled. This
has been the single most important feminist legal strategy and is the
theoretical underpinning of the entire women's rights movement in
law. 1
Their goal was to expose those irrational emblems of law because exposure
would then enable the repeal of laws that denied women rights.
Crucial to this discussion is the significance of the critical lens developed
by those feminist theorists with ties to Critical Legal Studies." 6 Olsen
explains: "The idea that law is objective is refuted by the gradual
recognition that policy issues appear everywhere. Every time a choice is
made, every legal decision that is not obvious and uncontroversial, is a
decision based on policy-which can't be objective.""' One significant
observation about the development of critiques of the law is that it
highlights specific trends within feminist legal theory and debates over
what strategies advocates might pursue to address women's inequality
under law, namely equal treatment, cultural/difference, and dominance
theory.
Equal treatment presupposes that laws, social customs, and norms have
contributed to inequality. Once those norms evolve through legal change,
women's status then changes. Cultural/difference theory argues that
women are unequal in society because their differences from men are not
recognized under law, and when forced to fit into a male norm not meant to
serve them, women experience inequality. Once laws are used to recognize
and protect women's differences, women can become equal. Dominance
feminists agree that the true sources of women's inequality are the laws,
social customs, and norms. In their view, the true problem is that those
laws, social customs, and norms dominate women." 8 Once domination is
ended, women will become equal to men."19
Feminist legal theorists question everything about "the relationship
113. Id.
114. Frances Olsen, The Sex of Law, in DAVID KAIRYS, THE POLITICS OF LAW: A
PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 691, 698 (3d. ed. 1998).
115. Id.
116. Id at 701.
117. Id.
118. LEVIT, supra note 109, at 9.
119. Id at 8-10.
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between law and society from the point of view of all women." 20 Wishik
notes that these types of scholarly inquiries can take several forms:
1. compensatory scholarship, the "add-women-and-stir" approach to
correcting what male scholars leave out;
2. criticism of the law and inquiries about law and society because they
exclude women and use patriarchically biased assumptions to further the
oppression of women;
3. collection of information about women's experiences of law from the
perspective of women; and
4. conceptualization of a feminist method with which to understand and
examine the law. 121
Drawing upon this typology, scholarship on the Married Women's
Property Acts has several emphases. Traditional legal scholarship on the
Married Women's Property Acts merely points to an important
development in American property law doctrine, one which informed
creditors' rights to access marital assets.122 By contrast, as the field of
women's history began developing in the late 1970s and 1980s, the
Married Women's Property Acts seemed a natural topic for historical and
compensatory, if not critical inquiry, insofar as the Married Women's
Property Acts directly implicated women's status in society pursuant to
Wishik's categorization. Historians focused on the impetus for the Married
Women's Property Acts and their passage as an a important development in
American law, a rejection of the rules of coverture that set forth women's
disabilities, namely their inability to manage and control their own
property. 12 3
Marylynn Salmon explained how women's historians began studying the
Married Women's Property Acts.124 The impetus and rationales were
similar to those that motivated feminist legal theorists. According to
Salmon, social history in the late 1960s and 1970s had an impact upon
120. Wishik, supra note 112, at 64.
121. Id. at 67.
122. See, e.g., Phipps, supra note, 2 (categorizing the states' treatment of women's
property rights subsequent to the passage of the Married Women's Property Acts);
Orth, supra note 48; Janet D. Ristko, Lien Times in Massachusetts: Tenancy by the
Entirety After Coraccio v. Lowell Five Cents Savings Bank, 30 NEW ENG. L. REV. 85
(1995).
123. See, e.g., Chused, supra note 95; Richard H. Chused, Late Nineteenth Century
Married Women's Property Law: Reception of the Early Married Women's Property
Acts by Courts and Legislatures, 29 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 3 (1985); LINDA K. KERBER,
WOMEN OF THE REPUBLIC: INTELLECT AND IDEOLOGY IN REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA
(1980); PEGGY A. RABKIN, FATHERS TO DAUGHTERS: THE LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF
FEMALE EMANCIPATION (1980).
124. MARYLYNN SALMON, WOMEN AND THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN EARLY AMERICA
xi (G. Edward White ed., 6th ed. 1986).
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legal history and women's history: legal historians began thinking about
the social movement's influence upon legal developments.125 Her interest
in the law of property developed because she "want[ed] to know how legal
rules affected women's day-to-day lives."l26 In addition, the two fields
taken together, women's history and legal history-women's legal
history-had powerful intersections with feminist legal theory:
Historians of women's legal status perceive the law as a powerful form
of social control, and therefore, we seek to uncover the relationship
between law and social policy. Law is coercive as well as representative
of community values.127
Prior to the passage of the Married Women's Property Acts, the common
law tenancy by the entirety reflected the social norms that pervaded
American society in the nineteenth century. 12 An idealized vision of
middle class and elite white women's status in society focused on the
"woman's sphere," 29 where women's role in society was ordained by God
and nature for a specific purpose. This social norm emphasized women's
usefulness in fulfilling female duties in the private realm such as,
"preserving the home, caring for the young and helpless, upholding
morality and religion."1 30 The public sphere of law was within the purview
of the male sphere, where husbands would represent the legal identity of
the household: a man with dependents, his wife and children.
New developments created a greater demand for women's access to
property rights. Crafty lawyers had long used equity to protect the assets of
women whose families wanted to avoid the harshness of the common law
rules, and trusts enabled some married women to have separate estates
maintained by third-party trustees.131 However, access to equitable
strategies was limited to those with knowledge; thus, large-scale reforms
were still needed.132 Equity was the means of effectuating legal reforms, as
various factors provided the impetus for passage of the Married Women's
Property Acts:
[D]evelopments in the culture at large created a milieu sympathetic to
125. Id. ("The new legal history emerged that emphasized the relationship between
law and social change.").
126. Id.
127. Id at xii.
128. NANCY COTT, THE BONDS OF WOMANHOOD: WOMAN'S SPHERE IN NEW
ENGLAND, 1780-1835 202 (1977).
129. Id. at 203.
130. Id. at 204.
131. Chused, supra note 95, at 1361.
132. NORMA BASCH, IN THE EYES OF THE LAW: WOMEN, MARRIAGE AND PROPERTY
IN 19TH CENTURY 148 (1982).
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changes in coverture law. Romantic notions of family formation and
maintenance, introduction of industrial production, and increases in
literacy and educational goals for children gave women significant
family roles. When distressed economic times appeared after 1839, the
moment was right for legislatures to codify a portion of the equitable
separate estate tradition by insulating wives' property from their
133
spouses' creditors.
Many of nineteenth-century legal thinkers believed that with separate
estates, a married woman could be protected in her traditional role by
having her assets spared if her husband became bankrupt.13 4 Chused notes
that it was only after these factors influenced the passage of the Married
Women's Property Acts that women's rights activists became more
involved in reforming coverture law.'35
Nonetheless, some of these early legal thinkers were troubled by the
implications of the Married Women's Property Acts. Wives who could
own, manage, and control property removed themselves from being under
their husband's control1 3 6 and the sexual division of labor.'3 1 Married
women were no longer subject to the common law restrictions that limited
their property rights, which meant that a wife "might very well enter the
commercial arena as a wage earner, or worse, an entrepreneur, becoming in
a sense her husband's competitor."13 8  The impetus for the Married
Women's Property Acts, prior to the Civil War, lay not in attempts to cause
social upheaval and gain absolute equality in society; instead, passage lay
in the legal and political recognition that married women were increasingly
vulnerable to marketplace conditions outside of the household, namely the
possibility of their husbands falling into crushing debt. As such, gaining
wives independent legal status-including their rights to control property-
became a matter for legal reform. 13 9
The debates were also colored by other parallel legal and social
developments. Amy Dru Stanley found that after the Civil War, debates
over the property rights of married women were colored by the language of
anti-slavery, which became linked to the language of contracts and the
rights of laborers. 14 0 In the wake of the abolition of slavery, individuals
133. Chused, supra note 95, at 1361.
134. BASCH, supra note 132, at 125.
135. Chused, supra note 95, at 1360-61; see also BASCH, supra note 132, at 136.
136. BASCH, supra note 132, at 38 ("To challenge the common law marital
prototype was to challenge the patriarchal organization of the family.").
137. Id. at 140.
138.- Id.
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questioned what labor should be paid and what labor should not be paid,
where freely negotiated contracts were presumed to be the norm: 141
Hirelings entitled to possess their own persons spoke of themselves as
slaves because their labor was for sale. Feminists spoke of wives as
slaves because by law, both their persons and labor belonged to their
husbands. And these arguments joined in revealing the conflict between
contract freedom and marriage bonds-in showing that husbands must
lose their rights as masters when wives sold their labor as a market
commodity. 2
Antebellum concerns that wives would compete with their husbands in the
workplace became subsumed by anxieties about what women in the
workplace meant to working class men who could not afford to maintain
their wives at home in "separate spheres" fashion.143
With more wives working for wages, the relevance of the Married
Women's Property Acts took on a different shape in the form of earnings
laws. By the late-nineteenth century, an overwhelming majority of states
had enacted Married Women's Property Acts, whereas only a few existed
prior to the Civil War.'" The emphasis was on working class wives
making contracts for labor and receiving wages in return for their labor.
This was distinct from the emphasis in the older Married Women's
Property Acts, which focused on the concerns of the middle and upper
classes: real and personal property, "including land, chattels and even
business enterprises."' 4 5 But wives' contracts for labor applied only to the
work performed outside of the home where they were "entitled to enter into
commodity relations." These were unmediated by their husbands'
control.14 6 This meant to the average working woman that the earnings
laws "established both her rights and her duties of contract, protecting her
wages against the claims not only of her husband but also of his
creditors."l47 In addition, she was legally liable for any debts she owed; her
creditors could access her pay. 14 8 At the same time, the average working
woman was still bound by her obligations to provide household labor.
14 1. Id.
142. AMY DRU STANLEY, FROM BONDAGE TO CONTRACT: WAGE LABOR, MARRIAGE
AND THE MARKET IN THE AGE OF SLAVE EMANCIPATION xi, xii (1998).
143. Id. at 182 ("The exchange of service for support remained the essential legal
rule, in spite of the circumstances that compelled both wife and husband to sell their
labor.").
144. Id.
145. Id. at 199.
146. Id. at 200.
147. Id
148. Reva B. Siegel, The Modernization of Marital Status Law: Adjudicating Wives'
Rights to Earnings, 1860-1930, 82 GEO. L.J. 2127, 2142 (1994).
115
25
Jones: Revisiting the Married Women's Property Acts: Recapturing Protect
Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2013
JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW [Vol. 22:1
Siegel provides an important link for understanding the persistence of
late-nineteenth century courts upholding women's domestic obligations
even though more women were participating in commerce and working
outside the home. The earnings statutes, she found, "did not completely
abolish the common law doctrine that made a husband owner of his wife's
labor; rather, the earnings statutes gave wives rights only in their labor
outside the home and continued to protect a husband's rights to his wife's
services in the home."14 9 If anything, women's household labor could be
used to minimize their contribution to the financial well-being of their
families. Even when they held property in their own names as married
women, wives could be found to have no interest in their property, "except
as the spouse of her husband. She neither bought nor paid for it.', 150
Wives' household labor in contributing to their households gave them no
claim to their families' assets, as their household duties were merely duties
for which they needed no recompense.
Perhaps it is these sorts of presumptions about married women's
property ownership that enabled the Massachusetts and New Jersey courts
in the twentieth century to presume that wives who owned property in their
own names did not really own the property. The presumption might have
been that the property was really the husbands', or that if it was wives', it
should be considered marital property by nature of the perception that in all
likelihood, the husbands bought the property and put it into their wives'
names. These sorts of presumptions about married women and property
ownership help to explain how the protectionist imperative could become
lost as modern courts interpreted the Married Women's Property Acts.
Gregory Alexander noted that there was a significant tension in the
Married Women's Property Acts insofar as, "two protectionist theories
were at issue ... protection of wives by husbands ... and protection of
wives against their husbands."' 5 One can read the earliest passage of the
Married Women's Property Acts in light of Alexander's formulation. The
earliest passage of the Married Women's Property Acts aimed to protect
wives from their husbands' creditors in the wake of "the widespread and
devastating economic depression throughout the nation that followed the
Panic of 1837."l52 This fueled an interest in "protecting family property"
from attachment.'13  The dark side of protecting women and family
property related to protecting women who were married to "an ill-tempered
149. Siegel, supra note 8, at 1076; Siegel, supra note 148, at 2127-2211.
150. Siegel, supra note 148, at 2128.
151. GREGORY ALEXANDER, COMMODITY AND PROPRIETY: COMPETING VISIONS OF
PROPERTY IN AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT, 1776-1970, 159 (1997).
152. Id. at 168.
153. Id. at 168.
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and unprincipled husband ... constrained by law to be the servant and
slave" of her "lord and master."' 54 These were men who, regardless of
their social class and background, would take advantage of their intimate
knowledge of their wives' finances for their own personal gain. Under the
common law regime, these men had free reign to do with their wives'
separate estate as they saw fit. Therefore, reformers, "stressed the inability
of the wife to protect herself' in their demands for reform.
Alexander's observations about the movement to reform married
women's property rights provides an important link for discussing
creditors' claims and interpreting the Married Women's Property Act
decisions of the twentieth century. The movement was inspired by two
different goals-husbands protecting wives and protecting wives from
husbands. Courts seemed to forget that protection of married women from
their husbands' creditors was an important goal behind the Married
Women's Property Acts. Wives, who presumably had all right to protect
their separate property, were vulnerable to the conservative mindset of the
Court that aimed to reinforce the traditionalist view of husbands who were
in charge of their wives and wielded financial control on behalf of families.
As Basch noted, the Married Women's Property Acts:
[flailed to obliterate the historical barriers the common law had thrown
around married women. Failure stemmed from the sheer inability of
piecemeal, remedial legislation to reconstruct comprehensively the vast
body of domestic relations laws which was an intrinsic part of the Anglo-
American legal tradition. Failure also came from the readiness of the
judiciary to interpret the intent and spirit of the legislation as
conservatively as possible.156
Basch observed that these developments took place through specific
juridical interpretations of the Married Women's Property Acts. Courts
found "sections unconstitutional and void," and narrowed "the applicability
of the statutes."' 5 7  They referenced "precedents that required the
delineation of the married woman's estate to be clear and unambiguous." 5 8
Finally, "by professing their faith in the propriety and desirability of the old
common law fiction of marital unity," 59 justices "eviscerated the spirit and
intent of the legislation."160
154. NORMA BASCH, IN THE EYES OF THE LAW: WOMEN, MARRIAGE AND PROPERTY
IN 19TH CENTURY 118 (1982).
155. Id at 172.
156. Id. at 200.
157. Id. at 202.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 203.
117
27
Jones: Revisiting the Married Women's Property Acts: Recapturing Protect
Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2013
JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW [Vol. 22:1
Basch provided various examples of how courts limited the effectiveness
of the Married Women's Property Acts.161 The constitutional argument
that courts provided reflected concern that the Married Women's Property
Acts comprised an "impairment of contractual obligations,"162 insofar as
men who married prior to the passage of the Married Women's Property
Acts had certain expectations regarding their marital rights.163 In order to
protect traditional marriage, jurists argued that "the court [was] the
defender of ancient constitutional rights against the excesses of modern
reformers"' who would cause upheaval in traditional marital relations.
The argument regarding protection of traditional marriage was easy to
make, as husbands' obligations to support wives persisted notwithstanding
the changes in the law.165 Moreover, notwithstanding the newer laws that
enabled married women to maintain separate estates, it was not uncommon
for wives to commingle their property with their husbands or to purchase
property for their husbands. If it was unclear that the property truly
belonged to the wife only, courts were unwilling to find that a separate
estate existed. Finally, if spouses were believed to be defrauding third-
parties by putting property into the wife's name, courts were less willing to
recognize that a separate estate existed.
Notwithstanding the possibility that nineteenth century jurists
legitimately struggled to determine the true extent of wives separate estates,
there may be an alternative explanation. Drawing upon feminist legal
theory, an argument can be made that there was the promise of protection
that floundered in the face of the common law view of domination of
wives:
Antebellum feminists and many of their contemporaries viewed the
married women's acts as a legal and social revolution. The critical test,
however, took place in the courts, where judges clearly demonstrated the
weakness of the statutes relative to the common law. For this reason, the
married women's acts cannot be construed as a revolution.166
Thus, it is striking that the Massachusetts and New Jersey courts seemed
to stress in the twentieth century a vision of equality that did not exist when
161. See id. (providing examples of judicial resistance to litigants trying to apply the
Acts retrospectively).
162. Id.
163. Id. ("If marriage was a contract like any other, the husband's marital rights
were part of the contract and could not be abrogated by an act of the Legislature after
the contract was made.").
164. Id. at 206.
165. Id. at 218 ("The statutes did not relieve the husband of his duty to support [his
wife] regardless of the size of the wife's estate.").
166. Id. at 200.
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the Married Women's Property Acts were passed. The common law
presumed competent husbands would manage their households and
property, including that of their wives' property. 67 Under the guise of
protection, women were shielded from property management, but the law
was said to protect wives from profligate husbands who would take
advantage of their wives' financial status. Thus, dominance of wives with
property persisted as is demonstrated by the twentieth century cases
interpreting the Married Women's Property Acts.
III. Coraccio v. Lowell Cents and Dime Savings Bank,168 King v. Greene,169
and Sawada v. Endo:o70 Failing to Ask the Debt Protection Questions
Early interpretations of the Married Women's Property Acts tended
towards a more conservative approach. Once modem courts interpreted the
Married Women's Property Acts, several consequences followed. Courts
ignored the original intention of recognizing wives' separate estates and
protecting them from their husbands' debts.17 1 Instead, Courts enabled
what seemed to be the financial exploitation of wives by their husbands'
creditors, if not by their husbands themselves.172 If the traditionalist view
of family unity under the common law rules presumed benevolence in
paternalism, these cases marked paternalism's dark side-family unity as a
mask for exploitation. It is not surprising that a comprehensive study of a
case that affirmed married women's equal rights to manage marital
property in Massachusetts failed to ask the gender-based debt protection
questions that would have been familiar to nineteenth century reformers.
The study followed the traditional model of discussing the case in light of
its implications for doctrinal development, but not as a topic in women's
legal history, and not as a study of how a gender-based critique of the
tenancy by the entirety might be made.'73 This is particularly significant
because the facts alleged in the case had serious implications for gender.
These implications were not in the way that one might imagine, as being
merely about a spouse's equal rights. Rather, the underlying facts raised
167. Id. at 218-19.
168. Coraccio v. Lowell Five Cents Say. Bank, 612 N.E.2d 650 (Mass. 1993).
169. King v. Greene, 153 A.2d 49 (N.J. 1959).
170. Sawada v. Endo, 561 P.2d 1291 (Haw. 1977).
171. Id. at 60; Coraccio, 612 N.E.2d at 656.
172. King, 153 A.2d at 60.
173. See Robert Brooks, Real Propert-Tenancy by the Entireties-Alienability of
Right of Survivorship, 58 MICH. L. REv. 601, 601-02 (1960) (evaluating King v.
Greene and taking a similar approach of focusing on doctrine in the face of evidence of
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implications for advocacy-that a married woman was being defrauded of
her property. The study merely examined "the [] case and its effect on
Massachusetts tenancies by the entirety created thereafter."1 74
Students are not learning gender-based critiques as the doctrinal model
of teaching the tenancy by the entirety is reflected in the law journal
commentary and literature from casebooks. Students are not learning a key
point of advocacy in general or as it applies to gender-based dynamics.
Amsterdam and Bruner assess advocacy in terms of developing stories and
telling narratives.'7 5 They observe:
Clients tell stories to lawyers, who must figure out what to make of what
they hear. As clients and lawyers talk, the client's story gets recast into
plights and prospects, plots . . . . If circumstances warrant, the lawyers
retell their client's stories in the form of pleas and arguments to judges
and testimony to juries . . . . Next, judges and jurors retell the stories to
themselves or to each other in the form of instructions, deliberations, a
verdict, a set of findings, or an opinion.176
The problem for feminist legal theory regarding property law is that the
narrative about women, as traditionally developed by lawyers and jurists,
has in fact shortchanged them. The story about married women under the
common law was that married women were better served by submitting to
their husbands' leadership with respect to property law, and that as such,
their husbands alone should have the right to access and control marital
assets and any property obtained before and during the course of the
marriage. These presumptions colored the view taken by twentieth century
jurists.
Returning to Coraccio v. Lowell Five Cents and Dime Savings Bank,177
where Massachusetts adhered to a nineteenth century formulation of the
Married Women's Property Acts that did not recognize married women's
rights to access marital property, newer developments promised to improve
married women's property rights.'78  Through Coraccio, Massachusetts
modernized its tenancy by the entirety. The Commonwealth of
Massachusetts would no longer follow the Group One formulation. Instead
it would follow Group Two and permit both spouses to alienate a share of
174. Ritsko, supra note 69, at 89.
175. See generally ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE
LAW: How COURTS RELY ON STORYTELLING, AND How THEIR STORIES CHANGE THE
WAY WE UNDERSTAND THE LAW OURSELVEs (2000).
176. Id. at 110.
177. 612 N.E.2d 650 (Mass. 1993).
178. See id. at 652-54 (noting that by the end of the 20th century, the Massachusetts
legislature sought to equalize the rights of men and women).
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the tenancy by the entirety.17 9 Ritsko failed to address the significant debt
protection and gender-based issues inherent to the case. There was no
discussion of the inequities in spouses' property ownership that led to the
passage of the statute in 1979 that equalized spouses' rights. As a result,
the traditionalist view of husbands controlling assets was permitted to
persist.
Nancy Coraccio challenged the Lowell Five Cents Savings Bank's right
to foreclose on a second mortgage taken out by her husband on property
that they owned. 8 0 In 1984, she purchased property in her own name.' 8 '
One year later, she sought a mortgage. 182 The bank insisted that she convey
the property to herself and her husband Stephen Coraccio as tenants by the
entirety, and the bank then granted the loan.183 Three years later, the bank
granted a second mortgage to Stephen Coraccio alone; Nancy Coraccio was
not a signatory on the loan.18 4 Stephen Coraccio subsequently paid off the
second mortgage.'8 5 In 1988, Stephen Coraccio once again sought a second
mortgage in his name, without Nancy Coraccio's knowledge.'86 He then
defaulted, and the bank began foreclosure proceedings in 1989.' 87 Nancy
Coraccio only learned of the mortgages and the foreclosure upon reading
an announcement in a local newspaper.'88
It is plausible that Nancy Coraccio knew about the mortgages and that
the foreclosure was not a surprise. Her husband could have taken the loans
with her knowledge. The important point is that if Nancy Coraccio knew
about the loans, Massachusetts' status as a Group One state acted as a
double-edged sword. On the one hand, its status enabled her husband to
take out loans without her knowledge. On the other, it could have enabled
her to hide any knowledge of his loans because the rules did not accord
wives equal status with their husbands with regard to their ability to control
and manage marital property.
The court read the pleadings to indicate that the property, a house in
Chelmsford, was the couple's principal residence.'8 9 Based on this reading
179. See generally id. at 655 (explaining that spousal consent is not required before
a mortgage may encumber a property).
180. Id. at 651.








189. Id. at n.2.
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of the pleadings, it would seem that Nancy Coraccio's original intent was
to purchase the house with her own funds and put it in her name only, even
though she intended that her husband would live there with her. This was,
without question, an unorthodox strategy to take in purchasing a house. It
might have been that Stephen Coraccio did not have as much capital for a
house purchase so she provided the funding, or Nancy Coraccio had better
credit, and as such, she wanted to be the spouse to purchase the house, lest
they be denied all together if he were the purchaser. As unorthodox as it
might have been, it would have been appropriate, in light of the spirit of the
Married Women's Property Acts, that Nancy Coraccio could use her own
money to purchase property in her name only.
Perhaps the bank wanted another party to be equally liable on the loan in
case Nancy Coraccio defaulted; thus the bank insisted that Stephen
Coraccio's name go on the deed so that he and Nancy Coraccio would own
the property as tenants by the entirety. It is possible that the bank's officers
drew upon cultural presumptions about a married woman's role in the
home, her ability to pay, or a husband's traditional role as the head of
household. Any such presumptions might have developed from
Massachusetts' status as a Group One state. Orth wondered whether the
rationales for maintaining the common law rule lay in the perception that
"women still needed the protection of a male-dominated tenancy, that men
were generally better suited to decide property questions, or simply that
some rule was required to resolve intra-spousal property disputes."o90 That
logic would certainly seem to apply here.
Nancy Coraccio claimed that the bank "deprived her of her right to
exercise equal control and management," with "no right to prevent the
execution of the second mortgage,"191 but she did not address the gender
discrimination issue in any depth. The bank's response indicated that
presumptions about marital property being exclusively within the province
of husbands' prerogatives could have had an effect.192 The Superior Court
granted the bank's claims without specifying the grounds upon which the
claim was granted.193
The rationale for Nancy Coraccio not having any standing because
Stephen Coraccio alone signed the mortgage note is significant. Nancy
Coraccio asserted that she had a continued right to possession and a right to
190. Orth, supra note 48, at 42.
191. Ritsko, supra note 69, at 107.
192. Coraccio, 612 N.E.2d at 652 ("Arguing that [Nancy] Coraccio lacked standing
to assert any claims arising out of the second mortgage because she was not a party to
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survivorship.194  In addition, Nancy Coraccio had rights to control and
manage the property, just like her husband did. The basis for her argument
was that the bank did not give her the chance to prevent the second
mortgage or negotiate its terms.'95 Moreover, she might have believed that
she had standing on another basis. When the bank required Nancy
Coraccio to re-convey the property to herself and her husband as tenants by
the entirety to obtain the first mortgage, she believed that the property was
eventually going to be hers alone, just as before which he did six months
after the last conveyance, but it was never recorded.'96  The bank's
attorney, James A. Hall, did the paperwork for all the mortgages.'97 There
was no explanation for the attorney's failure to re-convey the property to
Nancy Coraccio alone.
The Supreme Judicial Court explained that Massachusetts' interpretation
of the tenancy by the entirety retained its common law attributes
notwithstanding the passage of the Married Women's Property Acts.198
Massachusetts was a Group One state; husbands had the exclusive right to
control and possession of the marital property and that of their wives;'99
"[s]tatutes relating to the separate rights of married women have not
changed the common law rights of the husband in such estates."200 Neither
spouse could alienate, sever, or partition away the rights of the other
spouse. The surviving spouse held the entirety upon the death of the
creditor spouse. In practice, however, this meant that the husband alone
could alienate his share of the estate.20'
The Group One formulation had been the law in Massachusetts since the
late nineteenth century. However, the Supreme Judicial Court was faced
with a modernizing statute, forcing it to reconsider Massachusetts' status as
a Group One state. Pursuant to Chapter 209 of Massachusetts General
194. Id. at n.2.
195. Ritsko, supra note 69, at 107.
196. Id. at n.139 ("The Coraccios agreed that Stephen Coraccio would re-convey the
property to his wife at a later date.").
197. Id. at 106.
198. See Coraccio, 612 N.E.2d at 654-55 (stating that the characteristics of tenancy
by the entirety were not altered and that it remains a unitary title that guarantees each
spouse an equal right to the whole).
199. Id. at 653 ("By that law the right to control the possession of such an estate
during their joint lives is in the husband," including "the usufruct of all the real estate
which his wife has in fee simple, fee tail, or for life.").
200. Id.
201. Id. ("Although an individual creditor of the husband could levy and sell on
execution his interest in the tenancy, and dispossess both the husband and wife, the
property always remained subject to a survivorship right held by the wife.").
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Law,202 the Massachusetts' legislature gave wives equal rights to control,
manage, and possess tenancy by the entirety property, and at the same time,
it limited the marital property interests that could be seized by a creditor. 203
The statute applied to tenancies by the entirety created after February 11,
1980.204
The court applied this new rule to the facts in Coraccio.205 Stephen
Coraccio, pursuant to the common law tenancy by the entirety, had the
right to mortgage his interest in the property without his wife's consent, but
Nancy Coraccio still had her right of survivorship that could not be
severed.206 She still had a right to the whole property if Stephen Coraccio
died before her.207 Nancy Coraccio had the right to do the same thing her
husband could do, mortgage and convey her survivorship rights.208 The
possibility of seizing the right of survivorship of a debtor spouse was
limited, however. If the marital property was not the primary residence of
the non-debtor spouse, the interest of the debtor spouse could have been
seized.2 09 The legislation added that both spouses were jointly liable for
debts incurred for "necessaries furnished to either spouse or to a member of
their family."210
As a result of the court's interpretation of the statute, Massachusetts fell
into Group Two, since each spouse could convey a share of the marital
tenancy, including the right of survivorship. The Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts affirmed that the case was appropriately dismissed,
holding that Nancy Coraccio did not have standing to protest her husband's
mortgage of his interest in the tenancy by the entirety. 211 The court noted
further that the Land Court could not foreclose the property as long as it
202. MASS. GEN. LAWS Ch. 208, § 1 (1979).
203. Coraccio, 612 N.E.2d at 654 ("The interests of a debtor spouse in property held
[by] tenants [in] the entirety shall not be subject to seizure or execution by a creditor of
such debtor spouse so long as such property is the principal residence of the debtor
spouse .... ).
204. Id. at 653-54.
205. Id. at 652.
206. See id. at 655 (noting that each spouse has an indestructible right of
survivorship).
207. See id. (stating that an estate is not subject to voluntary partition).
208. See id. at 655 (explaining that there are not any state laws preventing a co-
owner from mortgaging or making an effective conveyance of his or her interest in the
tenancy).
209. See id. at n.9 ("We express no views on the rights of the spouses or the
creditors of either as to property held by spouses as tenants by the entirety where the
property is not the principle residence of the spouses.").
210. Id. at 654.
211. Id. at 655.
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was the primary residence of Nancy Coraccio. It is interesting that she
had no basis to challenge her husband's actions in the end, because, due to
the court's stance on equality, wives could do what husbands once did.
Each spouse is permitted to convey all of his or her property rights under
Massachusetts' modem formulation of the tenancy by the entirety.
Nonetheless, the court's judgment protected Nancy Coraccio from
foreclosure. The bank's misapplication of the Group One formulation
enabled it to require Nancy Coraccio to convey her property to her and her
husband, before a mortgage could be granted.2 13 This formulation also
made it possible for her husband to take out mortgages ostensibly without
her knowledge. Although the newly determined Group Two formulation
enabled the court to dismiss her case, the savings clause in the statute
protected her from foreclosure.
The bank thus had a mortgage on a house that it could never foreclose on
for nonpayment as long as it was Nancy Coraccio's primary residence.
Whether this happened as a result of negligence is an important question.
The court noted that all the events in the case happened after the passage of
G. L. 209, which equalized the rights between husbands and wives with
respect to tenancies by the entirety.2 14 The bank acted as though the statute
had never been passed, and Stephen Coraccio had the sole right to control
the property, under the older Group One formulation.215 Not only did the
bank require Nancy Coraccio to put her husband's name on the deed and
then give Stephen Coraccio mortgages on his own, it did not require Nancy
Coraccio to sign off on any of the subsequent mortgages.2 16 If she had
signed off on the mortgages, each of their interests would have been liable
for seizure. Therefore, even if Nancy Coraccio knew of the mortgages, the
bank's failure to recognize the growing equality in spousal rights made it
vulnerable. Rooted in Group One-based paternalism, the bank missed the
key link between feminist theory and changes in property law.
In the modem period, as compared to the historical periods when the first
married women's property acts were passed, equalization on the basis of
gender was the intent. The earlier period of the nineteenth century was
marked by the perspective that a married woman's mere ability to keep
property in her name during the course of her marriage allowed for
traditional relationships between husbands and wives to be overturned. By
the late twentieth century, egalitarianism in spousal relationships was
212. Id. at 656.
213. See id. at 652 (noting that the bank insisted Coraccio convey the property to
herself and husband as tenants by the entirety to receive the first mortgage).
214. Id. at 651.
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becoming more and more common. With egalitarianism came the greater
possibility of making mistaken presumptions based on traditionalism. The
bank was not effective at protecting its interests when it appeared to let the
default model of traditionalism determine policy. Accordingly, the bank's
attorneys had a special role in informing the bank of the changes. Whether
the attorneys did or did not is unknown, but it is not as though the change
was unpublicized.217
The decision might have turned out differently had there been some
recognition of the debt protection and gender-based issues that were at
stake. The Married Women's Property Acts intended for wives to have
separate estates so that they might be protected from their husbands'
debts.2 18 As such, there was no reason to require Nancy Coraccio to have
her husband on the deed if she wanted to get a loan. If, as Basch argued,
the early conservative trend of marital assets encompassing wives' separate
property persisted, the decision is not surprising. If, however, Nancy
Coraccio's attorney had asked the debt protection and gender questions,
there might have been strong allegations that gender-based discrimination
was at play, and that the bank was prejudiced against her as a married
woman owning real estate in her name only. The decision might not have
turned out differently, in that a gender-based argument could have led to
the same outcome in the end-a refusal. The court could have refused to
permit the bank to foreclose on the house because the house was Nancy
Coraccio's primary residence and she was a non-debtor spouse. Raising
the gender question might have enabled the court to discuss the bank's
failure to recognize her rights, and ultimately, to get at the heart of the
statute's meaning in a more egalitarian era-the protection of married
women's property interests in the late-twentieth century.
A. The Married Women's Property Acts: The Modern Day Cases in the
Property Law Classroom
Editors of property law textbooks are in a unique position to raise these
gender-based developments in property law doctrine. The first edition of
Chase's textbook explored, through Coraccio,2 19 the means by which
217. Dorcas D. Park, The New Tenancy by the Entirety: More Questions than
Answers, 8 MASS. LAW WEEKLY 367 (Dec. 24, 1979).
218. See Coraccio, 612 N.E.2d at 653 (discussing that a wife's right of survivorship
was not attachable by individual creditors nor alienable by her).
219. See EDWARD E. CHASE, PROPERTY LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND QUESTIONS
323-27 (2002); JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 367 (7th ed. 2010) (mentioning
Coraccio and the statutes in North Carolina and Michigan-MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
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Massachusetts transitioned away from its Group One status. Massachusetts
had been one of the few states that did not find that the Married Women's
Property Acts made any substantial changes to married women's rights
under tenancy by the entirety.2 20 In the second edition, Coraccio is not the
principal case. Instead, King v. Greene2 2 1 explains the consequences of the
tenancy by the entirety.222 The facts in each case, when tied to its coverage,
present the ideal fact pattern for addressing the focal questions of feminist
legal theory and practice raised in this article.
By the second edition of the text, Chase and Forrester considered the
evolution of married women's property interests in New Jersey.223 New
Jersey was different from the states that no longer recognized tenancy by
the entirety.224 The court interpreted the Act as not retaining the common
law rules of the Group One states.225 Instead, it put the wife on par with the
husband:
"[Spouses] hold as tenants in common for their joint lives ...
survivorship exists as at common law and is indestructible by unilateral
action. . . the rights of each spouse in the estate are alienable, voluntarily
or involuntarily, the purchaser becoming a tenant in common with the
Note that Dukeminier, at 361-66, focuses upon Sawada v. Endo as the most recent
example of a jurisdiction grappling with the implications for creditors' rights in a
tenancy by the entirety. Sawada v. Endo, 561 P.2d 1291 (Haw. 1977). This case was
different from Coraccio in that it did not involve a wife who needed protection from a
husband who took out loans in his own name. Instead, a tenancy by the entirety was
conveyed by the spouses to their sons, for the alleged purpose of escaping liability for
damages in a tort action.
Chase offers a more nuanced discussion through a discussion of both Coraccio and
King v. Greene. Chase explored how these states grappled with other implications
found in the tenancy by the entirety, tracing the evolution of the doctrine through the
cases in the text. Recall, that under the common law tenancy by the entirety, a debtor
husband's interest might be vulnerable to foreclosure. But the cases in the text ask,
what are the rights and responsibilities of debtor spouses, husbands, and wives in the
various formulations, Groups 1 through 4?
Since no state currently pursues the group 1 model, the texts explore what the logic was
that led to developments. See also Patricia A. Cain, Two Sisters vs. A Father and Two
Sons: The Story of Sawada v. Endo, in PROPERTY STORIES 99, 99-122 (Gerald
Komgold & Andrew P. Morriss 2d ed. 2009) (discussing further the Sawada case).
220. CHASE, supra note 219.
221. 153 A.2d 49 (N.J. 1959).
222. EDWARD E. CHASE & JULIA PATTERSON FORRESTER, PROPERTY LAW: CASES,
MATERIALS AND QUESTIONs 335-39 (2d ed. 2010).
223. Id. ("In the absence of legislating, abolishing or altering estates by the entirety,
our role, in light of the settled precedent that they do exist in New Jersey, is merely to
define their incidents.").
224. King, 153 A.2d at 59; see also CHASE & FORRESTER, supra note 221, at 337.
225. CHASE & FORRESTER, supra note 222.
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remaining spouse for the joint lives of the husband and wife." 226
In the principal case, King,227 Marie King had acquired, in 1913, the title
to three lots in Shrewsbury. In 1931, her husband, Phillip King, brought an
action against her in the Court of Chancery, which entered a decree stating
that she owed him $1,225.228 The court ordered her to execute a
conveyance of the three lots to herself and her husband as tenants by the
entirety.229 The opinion did not clearly state how these developments
arose.230 It is possible that she was a single woman when she acquired the
lots. If this were the case, the property should have been protected from
her husband or his creditors, according to the Married Women's Property
Act. 2 3 ' The documents do not explain why her husband was suing her. It
did not appear as though they were getting divorced and hence were not
dividing up the marital property.
One plausible argument is that her husband was in debt and that his
creditors viewed her properties as marital assets. Here, the debt could also
have been a familial debt that both were responsible for. Perhaps Phillip
King's creditors saw Marie King's acquisition of the property as a means
for the King family to hide assets. This was probable if the property was
once in his name but was then put into hers, or if she bought it after the
marriage but with funds that belonged to him, or even, both of them. Such
strategies, if not caught, would have enabled the husband to escape
liability. Finally, as might have been the case in Coraccio, this could have
been a matter of traditionalist perspectives that survived the passage of the
Married Women's Property Acts. Such traditionalism could have pushed
Phillip King to claim the assets Marie King held in her name only. It is
possible he sued because he was responsible for her financial support, and
thus felt he should have access to her assets. There are many questions
about the facts.
Once again, from a feminist legal theory perspective, the nuances of this
fact pattern are just as troubling, and probably even more so, than
Coraccio. Nothing in the decision explains why Phillip King sued Marie
King and won a judgment of $1225, or why, as part of the order, a re-
226. King, 153 A.2d at 59.
227. Id. at 50-51.
228. Id. at 51.
229. Id. See also CHASE & FORRESTER, supra note 222, at 335.
230. King, 153 A.2d at 51. In 1957, Marie King filed an action to possess the
property; before her husband died various creditors laid claim to the property. She
claimed rights as the surviving spouse. It is unclear, though, how she originally
obtained ownership. The trial court decided a motion for summary judgment in her
favor; the facts were merely stipulated and were not explained.
231. 1979 Mass. Act 768.
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conveyance was ordered. It is inexplicable why the basic rule of the
Married Women's Property Act did not apply:
the real and personal property of a woman which she owns at the time of
her marriage, and the real and personal property, and the rents, issues
and profits thereof, of a married woman, which she receives or obtains in
any manner whatever after her marriage, shall be her separate property as
if she were a female sole. 232
There is no conceivable reason that Marie King's husband should have
sued her and received a judgment that caused her to convey her property to
both of them. Whether or not Marie King was married in 1913, the
property belonged solely to her, according to the Married Women's
Property Act. Without a more comprehensive discussion of the facts, there
is no clear reason that explains why this happened, unless the intention was
to seize her property and deny her rights in the name of traditionalism. If
family unity was at stake, it was a family unity predicated on a legal action
that, if anything, would have contributed to disunity in the family as a
husband sued his wife. The traditional model of family unity, according to
the Married Women's Property Acts, meant that wives would be protected
from outsiders who might sue for and seize wives' assets. Separate
property was needed to protect women, and their families, from creditors.
There is no indication that the decision in King has been subjected to
close analysis in scholarly literature. However, a brief commentary on the
decision offers some insight into how the case was received.233 The
recitation of the facts did not offer any commentary on some of the key
gender-based questions. A husband sued his wife for some unknown
reason, and once judgment was found against her, she was ordered to make
a conveyance of property that she owned in her name only to both her and
her husband, as tenants by the entirety.234 The property was then
foreclosed upon.235 The commentary only offered a brief recitation of the
facts and procedural history.2 36 Mirroring the discussion of the case in the
opinion, the primary issue for the court was whether a right of survivorship
persisted in Mrs. King at the time of her husband's death.23 7
At an execution sale to satisfy a judgment against her, plaintiff s interest
in certain lots which she and her husband held as tenants by the entireties
was conveyed to A by sheriffs deed. Subsequently, plaintiffs husband
232. See id. at 59 (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37:2-12 (1852)).
233. See generally Robert Brooks, Real Property-Tenancy by the Entireties-
Alienability ofRight ofSurvivorship, 58 MICH. L. REv. 601, 601-03 (1960).
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joined A and his wife in a deed of their interest to B, who later conveyed
to defendants. After the death of her husband, plaintiff instituted an
action as surviving spouse for possession of these lots. The trial court
entered a summary judgment for plaintiff, holding that the sheriffs deed
conveyed only a severable one-half interest in use and profits of the land
during the joint lives of the spouses, and not plaintiffs right of
survivorship. On appeal, held, reversed. The purchaser from a tenant by
the entireties acquires that tenant's right of survivorship.238
This discussion of the case implies that both spouses had an equal right
to convey their rights to occupy and enjoy the property during the course of
the marriage and their survivorship interests. Under the common law, only
a husband had the right to possess and enjoy property, and he alone could
convey this interest and his right of survivorship. However, his
conveyance of his rights was subject to his wife's survivorship rights.
What is troubling is that the court's ruling in the name of equality-an
understanding of equality in each spouse's right to convey an interest in the
property-occurred when equality was not called for and protection should
have been the motivation instead. In King, as well as in Coraccio, forces of
institutional authority ordered a married woman to relinquish her full rights
in her property pursuant to unclear theories of the case under suspicious
circumstances. In these cases, prior to the threat of foreclosure, the wives
held the property in their own names and were later required to put their
husband's name on the deed, thus relinquishing full rights to what was once
their property alone. Tragedy followed once the husbands had access to the
property by tenancy by the entirety.
The irony is that if cultural presumptions about women's incompetence
in financial matters held sway, in Coraccio it seems the husband was
actually financially unreliable. Nevertheless, traditionalism presented the
husband as the more capable spouse to manage and protect the family's
resources. Once foreclosure occurred, the wife appeared to have no interest
in her husband's ability to convey his interest in the property, even though
she was protected from foreclosure as a non-debtor spouse. The husband
could have conveyed his interest, as under the common law, and the wife
could have done the same according to the modernizing trend. In the end,
the courts found in the name of equality, equal rights, and responsibilities
for husbands and wives, but these holdings were not predicated upon fact
patterns where equality played an initial role. The courts should have been
more willing to question the applicability of their presumption of equality
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B. Reinterpreting the Modern Cases: What Have We Missed?
In Coraccio, a bank serving as a mortgagee forced a married woman to
put her husband's name on her property.239 Her husband was then able to
get a mortgage without her consent.2 40 When he did not pay the mortgage,
the bank attempted foreclosure and she only found out by reading the local
newspaper. 24 1 The court held that she did not need to be informed that her
husband conveyed his interest in the tenancy by the entirety.242 Granted,
she was protected from foreclosure insofar as the property was her primary
residence, but she would have been better protected from foreclosure had
his name not been put onto the deed.243
In King, a woman's husband brought suit to gain a judgment against her,
the court found in his favor, and then entered a judgment ordering her to
relinquish her property rights and put his name onto the deed.24 Her
property rights were not protected.24 5 When the judgment was executed a
year later, her interest in the property was conveyed to third parties,
presumably creditors.246 Then her husband conveyed his interest to other
third parties.247 In the end, the Kings had no interest in the property.2 48 n
both cases, tragedy followed in that the women's property became
vulnerable to foreclosure once the creditors were not paid.2 4 9 Yet, drawing
upon these cases to modernize the tenancy by the entirety, the courts use
language of equality to gloss over the inequalities between the spouses that
initially existed.2 50
Charles Rounds has recently proposed a gender-based critique of marital
property interests drawn from protectionist type arguments.251 He believes
that feminist legal scholars should consider the significance of a long-
forgotten area of law-trusts-in addressing property matters within




243. See id. at 654 (quoting MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 209 § 1).




248. Id. at 60.
249. King, 153 A.2d at 60; Coraccio v. Lowell Five Cents Say. Bank, 612 N.E.2d
650, 652 (Mass. 1993).
250. See, e.g., King, 153 A.2d at 60; Coraccio, 612 N.E.2d at 654.
251. Charles E. Rounds, Jr., The Common Law Is Not Just About Contracts: How
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marriage.2 52 He argues that the law of trusts, which imposes fiduciary
obligations on a trustee to the beneficiary, could be a means of asserting
rights on behalf of married women. 253  He explains carefully that
confidential relationships are not the same as fiduciary relationships.2 54
The apparent blurring of confidential relationships and fiduciary
relationships-insofar as courts have become more willing to see fiduciary
obligations in confidential relationships-can benefit feminist legal
theory.255
For example, should courts broaden the definition of a fiduciary to
encompass a commercial lender who intends to extract a loan guarantee
from the wife of a borrower or declare a husband to be in a er se
fiduciary relationship with his wife, equity could work its magic.25
Rounds foresees courts assessing trustees' undivided loyalties, and their
obligations to beneficiaries. 257
The implications for Rounds' argument are apparent, insofar as his
argument articulates a feminist perspective on women's property rights and
the tenancy by the entirety. It highlights that presumptions about equality
can mask inequalities and a lack of protection. The wives in Coraccio and
King were in confidential fiduciary relationships with their husbands. Both
Nancy Coraccio and Wilma King put their property in their name as well
as their husband's, whether at the behest of a bank officer or at the order of
a court. This was an incredible risk, in that the men suddenly had property
rights that the common law tenancy by the entirety clearly recognized.
Yet, equity would say that the men's rights incurred special risks for the
women as a result of a fiduciary relationship. The husbands had an
obligation to protect their wives' rights and interests; because the common
law doctrine included ongoing presumptions about wives' inabilities, it
gave husbands absolute control. Drawing upon Rounds' logic, equity
might have found a remedy where the law courts could not.
One can argue Nancy Coraccio had a confidential relationship with the
bank, as she relied on the bank's advice to put her husband's name on the
252. Id at 1199.
253. Id. at 1187.
254. Id. at 1197 ("A confidential relation exists between two persons when one has
gained the confidence of the other and purports to act or advise with the other's interest
in mind. A key difference between the two relationships is the reliance requirement.
For a confidential relationship to arise, there must be reliance on the part of the one
reposing the confidence. A fiduciary relationship, on the other hand, brings with it a
duty of undivided loyalty, whether or not there has been reliance.").
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property. She purchased the house on her own and only sought a mortgage
one year later. She trusted the bank's advice that she needed her husband's
name on the deed in order to get the mortgage. Moreover, she expected
that once she conveyed the property to herself and her husband, he would
re-convey it to her alone. He did so, but the transaction was never
recorded. It is possible that the lawyer who processed the paperwork on
behalf of the bank failed to do what he was supposed to do. To compound
matters, the bank, knowing that Nancy Coraccio had an ongoing interest in
the property, did not inform her or gain her permission when it granted
Stephen Coraccio the second mortgage that led to the foreclosure.
Nancy Coraccio's claims resonated in the types of arguments Rounds'
imagined might be used by plaintiff wives asserting rights based on
confidential and fiduciary relations. Her claims sounded not only in
negligence, in that she asserted that the bank and the attorneys neglected
certain obligations they were required to undertake-processing and
closing loans-but that the attorneys also breached "an implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing," and intentionally interfered with a privileged
relationship.2 58 The language of good faith and fair dealing fits squarely
within the claim that a fiduciary relationship existed between Nancy
Coraccio and the bank. The bank had a confidential relationship with her,
she relied upon that in acting, but the bank did not act in fairness to the
obligations it incurred to protect her interests. As for interfering with a
privileged relationship, the bank enabled her husband to act contrary to his
fiduciary obligation to her as her spouse, and failed to protect her interests
in the property. They let him take out a loan without informing her of the
possible detriment for her: foreclosure.259
The Massachusetts statute seems to imply that debts held against the
interest of a debtor spouse in a tenancy by the entirety might make the
property liable for seizure, even if the property is the principal residence of
the non-debtor spouse.260 This could occur if either spouse, or both
spouses, became indebted in the process of providing "necessaries" on
behalf of either spouse, or their family.26' The argument could be made
that Stephen Coraccio did not escape responsibility for his family's
maintenance. From a purely pragmatic standpoint that would make sense
because indebtedness incurred for the benefit of the family fits the
258. Ritsko, supra note 69, at 104.
259. Coraccio v. Lowell Five Cents Say. Bank, 612 N.E.2d 650, 654 (Mass. 1993).
Granted, the foreclosure did not take place. The Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts held the property could not be foreclosed as long as it was her primary
residence. But if the court held differently, foreclosure could have occurred.
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traditional model of "tenancy by the entirety" by requiring husbands or
heads of household to provide for the family as a whole. Evidence in the
case was silent on the matter and nothing indicates that his debts were for
anything more than his personal indebtedness. This was something his
wife knew nothing about but left the family home vulnerable to
foreclosure.
Wilma King faced a similar conundrum of a confidential, if not
fiduciary, relationship violation. She purchased property in her own name,
but was forced to put the property in both her name and her husband's
name when he sued and received a judgment against her. Since the court
did not discuss the nature of the lawsuit, this appears to be a troubling
violation of a confidential relationship between a married couple who
shared intimate knowledge with one another. He knew what assets she
possessed. Thus, when he received a judgment against her, the court
required her to re-convey the property in both of their names.2 6 2 It is
unclear whether he sued on his own volition. It is possible he saw the
property as family assets and merely wanted tenancy by the entirety rights.
Perhaps his creditors took advantage of his knowledge of his wife's
finances, in order to reach assets that might be put up as collateral for his
debts.
As in Coraccio, the King property was threatened with foreclosure.2 63
Marie King's right, title, and interest in the property was then conveyed by
sheriffs deed to a third party named Crowell, and Phillip King conveyed
all of his in 1933 to another third-party, Smock. 26 Crowell conveyed his
interest to Smock at the same time.265 Phillip King then died in 1938.266 In
1946, Smock conveyed his interest to the defendants Joseph and Mabel
Greene. 267 Marie King's argument in 1957 was that the sheriffs deed in
1932 did not extinguish her right of survivorship and that in 1932 only half
of the "rents, issues and profits of the property during the joint lives of the
spouses" were conveyed.268
When Phillip King died, the spouses' joint life estate terminated; Marie
King asserted that she became the owner of the estate in fee simple.269 In
order for this argument to work, she must have believed that the
262. See id.
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conveyances did not disturb their survivorship interests-that both she and
her husband retained joint survivorship rights, which persisted
notwithstanding the conveyances. Thus, upon the death of her husband,
she retained a contingent right of survivorship to the whole estate.
Reversing the trial court judgment, which held in favor of her right to
survivorship, the appellate court explained:
It is clear that the Married Women's Act created an equality between the
spouses in New Jersey, insofar as tenancies by the entirety are
concerned. If, as we have previously concluded, the husband could
alienate his right of survivorship at common law, the wife, by virtue of
the act, can alienate her right of survivorship." The court added, "[t]hus,
the judgment creditors of either Souse may levy and execute upon their
separate rights of survivorship."2
As such, Marie King's survivorship interest was seized in 1932 when she
conveyed her present interest, but Phillip King still had his right to
survivorship to the whole estate, in the event that she predeceased him.271
When Phillip King conveyed his present interest in the property in 1933, he
conveyed his survivorship interest, and lost his interest.272 Once Phillip
King predeceased her, there was nothing else for her to gain in survivorship
interests.273
The court noted the mechanics of the newly reconfigured tenancy by the
entirety with respect to creditors' interests. Spouses:
hold as tenants in common for their joint lives; that survivorship exists as
at common law and is indestructible by unilateral action.. . the rights of
each spouse in the estate are alienable, voluntarily or involuntarily, the
purchaser becoming a tenant in common with the remaining spouse for
the joint lives of the husband and wife.274
Thus, New Jersey drafted the tenancy in common onto a tenancy by the
entirety where spouses retained joint survivorship rights.7 Once creditors
entered the picture, however, the tenancy in common doctrine would
prevail; when a creditor took the place of the debtor spouse and gained
rights to the whole property, the creditor's right would be contingent upon
270. Id. at 60.
271. Id. at 51, 60.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 59.
275. See CORNELIUS J. MOYNIHAN, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY
213-14 (2d. ed. 1988), for a reminder that one of the most significant differences
between the traditional tenancy in common, the other concurrent interests of the
tenancy by the entirety, and the joint tenancy, is that co-owners have separate interests
in the property without a right of survivorship.
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the debtor spouse surviving the non-debtor spouse.2 76 If the debtor spouse
did not survive, the survivorship interest of the non-debtor spouse could
defeat the creditor's right to the whole.277
Nonetheless, the language of equality pervaded-even without women's
history and feminist legal theory arguments-but not in a way one might
anticipate. "with wives holding as tenants in common with their husbands
for their joint lives. . .,,278 The question remained whether or not the court
should consider when and how the property was acquired. That significant
issue of whether the property should have been considered an asset liable to
becoming tenancy by the entirety remained unaddressed. Without any
information on Marie King owning the property in her name in an attempt
to hide assets, the property should have been considered hers only. A
discussion on the possibility that Marie King was hiding assets would have
enriched the court's discussion of marriage, spouse's separate identities,
and their implications on real life advocacy like protecting wives from their
husbands' debts.
In both King and Coraccio, it is questionable that each wife should have
been required to convey property to herself and her husband the property
she owned in her own name. For example, drawing upon Basch's
observations about the nineteenth century cases, there was no indication
that the spouses' assets were commingled to a point where it was
impossible to determine the real owner. In King, it did not seem that they
were seeking to defraud third parties, or in Coraccio that there was a
legitimate reason for making the husband also liable for the mortgage.
It is possible that the courts presumed the traditionalist view of marriage
should be upheld, that husbands presumptively control all marital property.
The courts could have presumed that husbands have greater potential to
earn and accumulate assets, and thus, rejected the concept that wives might
hold property in their name only. Whatever rationale motivated the courts
should have been stated explicitly. If anything, Coraccio and King provide
a means of drawing upon a gender-based feminist critique that addresses
their similarities. The failure to recognize their similarities in scholarly
texts appears to be an absolute lack of recognition that married women
retained their ability to hold and manage separate property as they could if
they were single women under the common law. This includes a failure to
recognize the possibility that wives might need protection from their
husbands' debts.
Creditors' rights and familial debts are important for students to consider
276. King v. Greene, 153 A.2d 49, 57 (N.J. 1959).
277. Id. at 58.
278. Id. at 59.
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when learning about the tenancy by the entirety and learning the
significance of the Married Women's Property Acts as they advocate for
clients. Ignoring gender is a significant shortcoming, especially in today's
world. Recent reports indicate that a growing number of wives now earn
more than their husbands, and as a result, they are likely to bring more
assets to the marriage and obtain more assets than their husbands during the
course of the marriage.279 Such developments are bound to complicate the
tenancy by the entirety even more so than before. Yet, the current
shortcomings of the gender assessment model, might make gender-based
analysis more difficult, as the current model does not address gender. It
would seem that advocating, or even recognizing, gender-based issues
posed by the tenancy by the entirety in these two cases, Coraccio and King,
is irrelevant from the viewpoint of first year pedagogy. Nonetheless, as
various scholars have argued, doctrine cannot be divorced from theory and
historical analysis, and discussing gender-based doctrines cannot be
ignored.2 80
The decisions in both Coraccio and King were steeped in discussion of
the historical developments in the tenancy by the entirety as a legal
doctrine, but they were not grounded in perspectives of women's history,
feminist legal theory, and the traditional push for reform-protection
against wives from debts incurred by their husbands. Thus, advocacy in
the courtroom could not include discussion of theoretical perspectives
outside of the doctrinal. A discussion of feminist legal theory was not
anachronistic in all early cases as it might have been in 1880s
Massachusetts, in light of those jurisdictions that abolished the tenancy by
the entirety long before. It was not even anachronistic in New Jersey in the
1950s, where discussions of women's property rights dated back to the
previous century. 28 1 Moreover, feminist legal theory was not anachronistic
in Massachusetts in the 1990s.
Nothing explains the inadequate framing and development of the
narrative on gender rights in the tenancy by the entirety. Gender-based
critiques within feminist legal theory were relevant in the 1990s; if
anything, the modem women's rights movement in Massachusetts provided
an impetus for modernizing the older common law, Group One
formulation. It is surprising that such a significant tool for analysis and
279. Liza Mundy, The Richer Sex, TIME, Mar. 26, 2012,
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2109140,00.html.
280. See, e.g., Patricia A. Cain & Linda K. Kerber, Subversive Moments:
Challenging the Traditions of Constitutional History, 13 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 91, 91
(2003).
281. See, e.g., King, 153 A.2d at 59 (noting the New Jersey Married Women's
Property Act was passed in 1852).
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advocacy did not seem to be relevant, even when the modem, late
twentieth-century Married Women's Property Act 28 2 aimed to overturn the
common law rule once recognized in Pray v. Stebbin.2 83 Pray stated:
By that law the right to control the possession of such an estate during
their joint lives is in the husband.... Neither could convey during their
joint lives so as to bind the other, or defeat the right of the survivor to the
whole estate.... he has the right to make a lease of an estate conveyed
to him and his wife, which will be good against the wife during coverture
and will fail only in the event of his wife surviving him.284
More than one hundred years later, the court in Coraccio noted that,
since Pray, the ability of wives to keep property in their own names did not
affect the common law tradition that limited their rights in the tenancy by
the entirety.2 85 In the twentieth century, the law modernized the status of
husbands and wives with respect to marital property, thus rejecting the
common law rule.
This development was apparently a response to the Equal Rights
Amendment and aimed to "equalize the interests of husband and wife in
real estate held by tenants by the entirety."286 It came into effect on
282. 1979 Mass. Acts 768 (amending MAsS. GEN. LAWS ch. 209 § 1 (1979) ("The
real and personal property of any person shall, upon marriage, remain the separate
property of such person, and a married person may receive, receipt for, hold, manage
and dispose of property, real and personal, in the same manner as if such person were
sole. A husband and wife shall be equally entitled to the rents, products, income or
profits and to the control, management and possession of property held by them as
tenants by the entirety. The interest of a debtor spouse in property held as tenants by
the entirety shall not be subject to seizure or execution by a creditor of such debtor
spouse so long as such property is the principal residence of the nondebtor spouse;
provided, however, both spouses shall be liable jointly or severally for debts incurred
on account of necessaries furnished to either spouses or to a member of their family.").
283. See 4 N.E. 824 (Mass. 1886) (interpreting the Married Women's Property
Act).
284. Id. at 826-27; see also Kathleen M. O'Connor, Marital Property Reform in
Massachusetts: A Choice for the New Millenium, 34 NEw ENG. L. REv. 261, 303
(1999) ("[I]t was not until 1845 that women in Massachusetts were first able to legally
keep and manage as 'sole and separate' property which women brought to, or acquired
after marriage, by gift, inheritance, bequest or devise. Starting in 1855, Massachusetts
began revising its statutes and women were finally allowed to make legally binding
contracts with their husbands or third parties, transfer or receive from their husbands
title to real or personal property ... and keep the proceeds of any work or labor
performed 'for a person other than her husband or children."').
285. Coraccio v. Lowell Five Cents Say. Bank, 612 N.E.2d 650, 653 (Mass. 1993)
("Statutes relating to the separate rights of married women have not changed the
common law rights of the husband in such estates.").
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February 11, 1980, and "only tenancies by the entirety created after that
date [were] affected." 287  Although the Equal Rights Amendment was
ratified in 1972, the federal amendment never became law.2 88
Massachusetts passed its own version on the state level, however.289 In all
likelihood, the state version was the one being discussed.
A commentator explained what the old tenancy by the entirety looked
like:
In the common law tenancy by the entirety, the husband had an exclusive
right to the possession and income from the property during his lifetime,
with the possibility of fee simple title on surviving the death of his wife.
He could convey this interest in the property and it could be attached and
sold by his creditors, but he could not destroy his widow's right to the
property in fee simple absolute on his death, free and clear from all
claims against the husband. The interest of the wife was limited to the
possible acquisition of absolute fee simple title if, and only if, she
survived her husband. She could not convey. Her creditors could not
attach her interest in the property while the husband lived. She could not
defeat her spouse's right to the whole should he survive her.290
Once the modification occurred, the state could "look forward to a
completely modern tenancy by the entirety." 291  Moreover, it explained
why the common law rule persisted in Massachusetts until 1979-it was a
jurisdiction steeped in the traditional common law view of women and
property rights:
[The] characteristics of the tenancy by the entirety were based on the
traditional way of thinking about females. Like infants and
incompetents, women were thought to be inherently unfitted for worldly
and economic pursuits, incapable of managing property, and in need of
287. Id.
288. See RosALiND ROSENBERG, DIVIDED LIVES: AMERICAN WOMEN IN THE
TwENTrIErH CENTURY 227 (2008) (discussing Phyllis Schlafly's role in opposition to
passage). "In 1979 the time allotted for ratification ran out. A three-year extension,
passed by Congress, proved no help to ERA supporters. In 1982, Schlafly and her
supporters could boast that not a single state had ratified the amendment since 1977,
and five had voted to rescind their initial endorsement. The ERA was dead." Id
289. See, e.g., LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF MASSACHUSETTS, Where We Stand,
Social Policy: Equal Opportunity,
http://017275e.netsolhost.com/equalopportunity.shtml (last visited May 25, 2013)
("LWVMA was successful in working with a large coalition for passage of the state
ERA by two consecutively elected legislatures meeting in joint session (1973-76) and
by the public in the vote on the November 1976 ballot. The con-stitutional [sic]
amendment passed by 62 percent of the vote. LWVMA has been active since then to
bring state laws and regulations into compliance with the state ERA.").




Jones: Revisiting the Married Women's Property Acts: Recapturing Protect
Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2013
JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW [Vol. 22:1
male protection. 1 Blackstone Commentaries, 441-444. 'And if they
will learn anything let them ask their husbands at home. . .' Corinthians
14:35. 292
Recall that the facts of Coraccio arose after the statute was passed, and it
was surprising that the loan officers did not seem to realize the bank's
vulnerable position in permitting the husband to take out loans in his own
name and in the marital home, for separate debts. The loan officers should
have seen the possibility that the marital home, as the non-debtor spouse's
share of the primary residence, was protected from foreclosure. 2 93  If
anything, they should have insisted that Mrs. Coraccio sign off on the loans
as well.
The decisions in Coraccio and King never addressed the gender-based
issues of discrimination, as the courts did not even consider gender outside
of noting the newer possibilities of equality found in the Married Women's
Property Acts. Under the Married Women's Property Acts, wives could
suddenly do what only husbands could do previously-have an equal right
to encumber or convey their share of the marital property. It could be
seized for their debts. 294 For both wives in these cases, this equality was
quite hollow, in that the inequities of the cases were not addressed in the
opinions. Their property was seized not because of equality, but because of
inequality. Equality did not seem to be at play when the women were
required to convert their separate property into marital property, which
could then be seized for their husbands' debts. Equality should have meant
that their separate property was theirs, and not to be seized. This is what
the Married Women's Property Acts were meant to ensure, protection for
292. Id.
293. Ritsko, supra note 69, at 138. Ritsko noted the significance of the homestead
exemption as applied to marital property, but that the exemption does not apply to
mortgages entered into for the purpose of purchasing the homestead property. This is
notable, in light of Ritsko's observations, that in Coraccio, non-debtor spousal consent
was not raised; "the SJC noted the absence of an express statutory joinder requirement
despite the fact that nothing in the statute's express language conflicted with the unitary
interest theory [of tenancy by the entirety property]." In fact, Ritsko has argued that
the legislature might modify chapter 209 for the express purpose of including a joinder
requirement; "Neither spouse may bargain, sell, lease, mortgage, transfer, convey or in
any manner encumber the property so held without written joinder of the other spouse."
The legislature has not updated the statute.
294. Phipps, supra note 2, at 31-32. Phipps described these as "increasing the wife's
prerogatives until they match those of the husband" in Group 2 jurisdictions, insofar as
he alone could do under the common law, she could now do under the modern form of
the tenancy by the entirety. She could now convey her share of the marital tenancy,
just like he could under the common law. In Group 3 jurisdictions, his prerogatives
were removed, so that the husband was now at the same level as his wife. Neither
spouse had the ability to convey a share of the marital property.
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wives and families in the name of family unity.
If the courts in Coraccio and King had asked gender questions as they
considered equality in the way nineteenth century jurists did in the
jurisdictions that abolished tenancy by the entirety, the presumptions about
married women and their ability to maintain separate estates could have
been attacked directly. The courts could have done this as well if they had
even considered the original purposes of the jurisdictions that upheld the
tenancy by the entirety. If the Massachusetts and New Jersey courts had
questioned the tenancy by the entirety, they could have developed a richer
and more nuanced discussion of wives' property rights. Without such
inquiries, the courts reasoned and commented mechanically as they
reflected the traditional doctrinal view of married women's rights under the
modem tenancy by the entirety. This was a modem tenancy by the entirety
consisting of a concurrent property interest grounded in gender dynamics,
but divorced from any discussion of gendered implications. Thus,
scholarly commentary is incomplete in its discussions.
Wilson has explained the five principal types of legal arguments-
arguments from the text, drafter's intent, precedent, tradition, and policy-
that first year students should understand as they learn to "think like
lawyers." These five principles provide a basis for developing skills in
cases like Coraccio or King. 295 Huhn explained the implications for each
argument type as they arise from different sources of law:
The five types of legal argument represent different conceptions of what
law is. Law may be considered the legal text itself. It may be regarded
as what the text meant to people who enacted it into law. Law may be
conceived of as the holdings or opinions of courts setting forth what the
law is. It may be thought of as the traditional ways in which members of
the community have conducted themselves. Finally, law may be
understood as the expression of the underlying values and interests that
the law is meant to serve.296
In considering these types of arguments, it is important to think that the
courts in Coraccio and King seemed to draw upon specific types of
arguments. They focused on the ostensible intent that led the drafters of
the statutes to inaugurate equality. A pure doctrinal perspective might look
merely to the words of a statute, or court opinion, without any context in
gender. The law is what the doctrine says it is: equality for spouses. But
the law is also about what people have come to accept in their interactions,
social norms that should be represented in law, and the cultural
understandings of law that Amsterdam and Bruner discussed-that
husbands should be in control not only of the marital property but also of
295. WILSON HUHN, THE FIvE TYPES OF LEGAL ARGUMENT ix, 3-5 (2008).
296. Id. at 13.
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their wives' separate property. 297 These were the values being articulated
in the cases, albeit not overtly.
The courts in Coraccio and King adhered to the purely formalistic, a
decontextualized discussion of gender. Equality meant equality regardless
of the underlying situations at play. The inequality that led to the cause of
action was minimized and considered irrelevant in judicial determinations.
The courts were merely modernizing the tenancy by the entirety. Thus,
there was no critique done by anyone-advocates, jurists, or scholars-on
the significance of applying the traditionalist way of organizing marital
relationships to the nontraditional situation of married women holding
significant real property assets in their own name.
Sawada v. Endo posed a different sort of challenge to the Hawaiian
court. 298 Kokichi and Ume Endo held a tenancy by the entirety and
Kokichi, the husband, was liable for damages he caused as a tortfeasor.2 99
Finding themselves frustrated in their ability to recover, the victims alleged
that conveying the property to the sons of their marriage, Samuel and Toru
Endo, was a fraudulent attempt to escape the Kokichi's creditors. 300 The
case is significant because it was the first time the court decided a tenancy
case involving the tenancy by the entirety, and it highlighted the court's
first impression .301 Noteworthy, as well, is that the gender issues did not
arise in the traditional fashion. After Kokichi and Ume Endo made the
conveyance to Samuel and Toru Endo, Kokichi Endo was found liable for
damages stemming from a motor vehicle accident that injured Masako
Sawada and Helen Sawada.302 A little over a week after the trial court
passed judgment, Ume Endo died.303 Kokichi Endo was thus a widower
and creditors sought enforcement of a judgment against him. 3 04
Although Phipps' taxonomy was significant in the court's assessment of
the then current status of the tenancy by the entirety in American
jurisdictions, the court was in the position to define property interests in
Hawaii. The court decided that the jurisdiction would follow the rule set
forth by those states in Group Three: spouses share "in an estate by the
297. ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW: How
COURTS RELY ON STORYTELLING, AND How THEIR STORIES CHANGE THE WAY WE
UNDERSTAND THE LAW OURSELVES 231-32 (2000).
298. 561 P.2d 1291 (Haw. 1977).
299. Id. at 1293.
300. Id. at 1293-94.
301. Not only was this a modem case of first impression, but Hawaii had only just
gained statehood in 1959.
302. Id. at 1293.
303. Id.
304. Id. at 1295.
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entireties is not subject to the claims... of creditors during [their] joint
lives."3 os The dissent believed, though, that the jurisdiction should follow
the rule followed by Group Two jurisdictions306 If anything, the dissent
believed that those states adhering to the Group Three formulation were
prejudiced against wives and their ability to manage marital property. A
more enlightened view would have enabled wives to obtain the rights that
were once exclusively held by their husbands, pursuant to Group Two.
In Sawada, the case turned on a legal matter that would have fit in with
the nineteenth century Married Women's Property Acts cases, protecting
wives from the debts of their husbands. When the property was conveyed
to the sons, the tortfeasor husband had not yet become a widower. It was
certainly feasible that, without the conveyance, his share of the marital
property could have had a lien placed upon it. This became all the more
crucial once he became a widower. He was the surviving debtor spouse
who lost the survivorship gamble. Had he been the one to die, his wife's
right to obtain the whole property, without regard to his creditors' interests,
could have prevailed. Yet, the court did not seem to recognize the
significance of these distinctions. The court's reasoning focused solely
upon what the spouses could do with the property during the course of the
marriage in an attempt to protect a significant family asset. Yet, this was
not relevant once the wife died. The typical nineteenth century scenario
did not apply. The court's holding meant that the sons' tenancy in common
persisted; it was perfectly legitimate for the parents to convey the property
to the sons. Thus, the victims' recovery depended upon whether the
tortfeasor was married at the time of the accident and had the foresight to
act shrewdly in hiding the assets.
Pat Cain described the implications found in the court's observations that
creditors would not be disadvantaged by its decision.0 She argued the
analogy to commercial lenders was inapposite in the case of tort victims
who would have no recourse as a result. 0 In light of the circumstances, I
would argue that the fairer response would have been to recognize the
significance of the facts and categorize Hawaii as a Group Four state,
305. Id.
306. Id. at 1298 ("I would hold that the separate interest of the husband in entireties
property, at least to the extent of his right of survivorship, is alienable by him and
subject to attachment by his separate creditors, so that a voluntary conveyance of the
husband's interest should be set aside where it is fraudulent as to such creditors . . . .").
307. Cain, supra note 219, at 114 (Gerald Korngold & Andrew P. Morriss ed., 2009)
("Creditors can inform themselves about what property the debtor owns and whether
the property is or is not reachable if the debtor defaults.").
308. Sawada v. Endo, 561 P.2d at 1298 ("Tort victims with no opportunity to review
the tortfeasor's creditworthiness before the accident.").
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where profits cannot be seized during the marriage, but the right of
survivorship might be attached. Such a model would protect non-debtor
spouses during marriage and address the possibility that the debtor spouse
could become the survivor.
One can understand the court stating it did not want Hawaii to become a
Group Two state, where either spouse might convey a marital interest that
can be attached during the course of the marriage. This is likely what the
plaintiffs would have wanted. But it is incomprehensible to make a
plaintiffs recovery depend on the tortfeasor's marital status, with no
recovery at all for creditors and no recovery of a survivorship interest if the
tortfeasor/debtor was the surviving spouse. The court was overly
protective of spousal rights and family unity where the spouse's interests
were not relevant in the way the court imagined.
In Coraccio, King, and Sawada, courts grappled with the historical and
modem significance of the Married Women's Property Acts. In the first
two cases, the courts seemed to forget the nineteenth century message
calling for protection of wives' separate property interests. Thus, in
Coraccio, a wife who owned property in her own name was told that if she
wanted a loan, she would have to put the property in both her and her
husband's names. Notwithstanding a modem twentieth century statute
equalizing wives' status, prejudices against married women managing
property prevailed; her husband took out loans without her knowledge and
the property was threatened with foreclosure when he failed to pay them.
In King, a wife who owned property in her own name was sued by her
husband. Once judgment was held against her, she was required to put her
property in both their names. These types of determinations were not new.
The message of protection became lost in the interpretations of the acts
long before the modem period, when courts first began hearing the cases.
The modem courts thus lost a chance to recapture and correct a
longstanding trend that denied wives protection. In Sawada, on the other
hand, the court read too much into the message of protection when it was
not relevant, as the debtor spouse was already a widower when the
creditors sought judgment against him.
IV. CONCLUSION
To the extent legal fictions highlight internal conflicts within law over
changes in the law's ideals, theories, and the realities, the tenancy by the
entirety indicates this tension. Legislatures were changing doctrines on
marital property, whether or not idealistic views of relationships between
spouses could catch up. Legal theory pointed to the rationales for change,
as driven by the experiences of women affected by the law, but the courts
were mixed in their responses to the changes that were happening. In the
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nineteenth century, protection was the underlying goal, but jurisdictions
grappled with how gender equality would be dealt with. Some courts
recognized women's equality by abolishing the tenancy by the entirety,
while other courts rejected equality and protected traditionalism: the
traditional prerogatives of husbands and the familial obligations of wives.
In the twentieth century, litigants might have used advocacy and pointed
courts towards recognizing gender-based questions when interpreting the
tenancy by the entirety: protection as compared to equality. This important
lesson is something our students might learn about advocacy from their
first year property curriculum.
It is striking that the Hawaii case, Sawada v. Endo, did not involve the
traditional type of debt protection envisioned by the nineteenth century
Married Women's Property Acts. The creditor spouse was the surviving
spouse and a widower. Prior to his wife's death, they put their tenancy by
the entirety into their sons' names. Once a judgment was found against the
husband, and he could not pay, the creditors challenged the conveyance,
alleging the Endo family only transferred their tenancy in order to escape
his creditors. Pursuant to the original understanding of the common law
tenancy by the entirety, if they had not conveyed their property to their
sons, Endo would have been liable to his creditors as the surviving spouse
who lost the survivorship gamble. Yet, he persuaded the court to reject the
traditional common law perspective.
This was a case of first impression and the court decided any one
spouse's share of the marital interest could not be liable for seizure. The
legal fiction is that the tenancy was in need of protection. The reality is
that there was not a non-debtor spouse to be shielded from foreclosure.
The court protected Endo's property from being seized and created a
precedent in Hawaii that protected all spouses from creditors hoping to
seize tenancy by the entirety property. The creditor's ability to recover was
dependent then upon whether the tortfeasor was married at the time and
whether there was a marital home at stake. These factors could have
placed the Endos at a disadvantage, had the court held differently and
enabled the property to be seized.
Considerable time has passed since Fuller wrote about fictions from the
perspective of a legal realist, fighting against the prevailing classical legal
thought that thrived on the fiction that law was logical and not policy-
oriented. 30 9 To that extent, the Married Women's Property Acts provide an
ideal example for exploring that supposition. A fair number of the cases,
decided by the courts in the wake of the Acts' passage, demonstrate the
challenges of classical legal thought. It is informative that this mode of
309. See, e.g., STEPHEN FELDMAN, AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT FROM
PREMODERNISM TO POSTMODERNISM: AN INTELLECTUAL VOYAGE 188 (2000).
145
55
Jones: Revisiting the Married Women's Property Acts: Recapturing Protect
Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2013
JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW [Vol. 22:1
legal thought presupposed a "natural order" which minimized the
possibilities for legal changes capable of responding to social and cultural
demands. 310 This study of the Married Women's Property Acts provides
examples for faculty to use when discussing the development of women's
property rights, from the perspective of feminist legal history and feminist
legal theory, as they might think about the role of ideology in determining
how the Married Women's Property Acts were interpreted after they were
passed. Such a pedagogical strategy could lead, then, to a discussion of the
rule of law, and the processes of justice, on whether there can be access to
justice when ideology blinds any critique of the process.
Massachusetts' early interpretation of the Married Women's Property
Act put it squarely in the camp of those few jurisdictions that adhered to
the common law view that the tenancy by the entirety had not changed. It
was not until the twentieth century, with the passage of a state equal rights
amendment, that the legislature equalized spousal property rights. Yet, the
case that was dispositive in interpreting the tenancy by the entirety, in light
of that amendment, was grounded in the unequal treatment of a married
woman who owned property. Even though the non-debtor wife escaped
foreclosure of the marital home, failure to recognize the growing modem
day trend towards equality meant a failure in advocacy. Ineffective
advocacy could have easily lost a married woman her property rights.
Blackstone believed the traditional common law protected women and
that separate spheres meant men should be in charge of the public sphere of
managing household property and equality was irrelevant. As such, a
woman's legal identity merged with her husband's upon marriage. Yet, the
question became whether a woman was truly "merged" with her husband.
Legal fictions are thus useful in providing context. In Massachusetts and
New Jersey, the Married Women's Property Acts were interpreted in the
twentieth century on a superficial level of equality that was, itself, fictional:
a presumed equality determining the ability of spouses to convey tenancy
by the entirety property interests. Perhaps Hawaii took the most protective
stance in the end, when it determined equality meant that spouses were
equally barred from conveying a share in property held in a tenancy by the
entirety. The Married Women's Property Acts exemplify critical thought's
maxim that the law is about politics, and that legal politics affect
interpretations of women's rights. Modem courts found equality where the
discussion should have focused instead on lack of protection and
domination.
All this presents the eternal conundrum addressed by feminist legal
theory: the appropriate recognition of, and balance in understanding the
310. See, e.g., id. at 115.
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significance of competing schools of feminist legal thought:
cultural/difference, equal treatment and dominance. This study presents an
example of the sameness/difference debate applied to marital property
rights and the tenancy by the entirety, leading to questions of whether
husbands and wives are always really "the same" when it comes to
property rights. The Massachusetts and New Jersey cases prove that
traditionalist presumptions about property management can undermine the
equality imperative. These modem courts that articulated a language of
equal treatment to understand the influence of the nineteenth century
Married Women's Property Acts on the tenancy by the entirety missed the
persisting trends that dominated wives who owned property. They did so
even though the original trend recognized differences and intended to
protect wives and their property. The doctrinal concepts stemming from
the law of trusts can offer insight into the implications of reconfiguring
protection.
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